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Abstract
In this thesis we study a series of multi-user resource-sharing problems
for the Internet, which involve distribution of a common resource among
participants of multi-user systems (servers or networks). We study concur-
rently accessible resources, which for end-users may be exclusively acces-
sible or non-exclusively. For all kinds we suggest a separate algorithm or
a modification of common reputation scheme. Every algorithm or method
is studied from different perspectives: optimality of protocols, selfishness
of end users, fairness of the protocol for end users. On the one hand the
multifaceted analysis allows us to select the most suited protocols among
a set of various available ones based on trade-offs of optima criteria. On
the other hand, the future Internet predictions dictate new rules for the
optimality we should take into account and new properties of the networks
that cannot be neglected anymore.
In this thesis we have studied new protocols for such resource-sharing prob-
lems as the backoff protocol, defense mechanisms against Denial-of-Service,
fairness and confidentiality for users in overlay networks. For backoff pro-
tocol we present analysis of a general backoff scheme, where an optimiza-
tion is applied to a general-view backoff function. It leads to an opti-
mality condition for backoff protocols in both slot times and continuous
time models. Additionally we present an extension for the backoff scheme
in order to achieve fairness for the participants in an unfair environment,
such as wireless signal strengths. Finally, for the backoff algorithm we sug-
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gest a reputation scheme that deals with misbehaving nodes. For the next
problem – denial-of-service attacks, we suggest two schemes that deal with
the malicious behavior for two conditions: forged identities and unspoofed
identities. For the first one we suggest a novel most-knocked-first-served
algorithm, while for the latter we apply a reputation mechanism in order
to restrict resource access for misbehaving nodes. Finally, we study the
reputation scheme for the overlays and peer-to-peer networks, where re-
source is not placed on a common station, but spread across the network.
The theoretical analysis suggests what behavior will be selected by the end
station under such a reputation mechanism.
Computing Reviews (1998) Categories and Subject
Descriptors:
C.2 Computer-Communication Networks
G.1.0 General
G.1.6 Optimization
G.1.8 Partial Differential Equations
G.3 Probability and Statistics
I.6 Simulation and Modeling
General Terms:
Thesis, Game Theory, Backoff Protocol, Denial-of-Service, resource
sharing
Additional Key Words and Phrases:
Applying Game Theory to the problem of fair resource sharing
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Preface
This work is dedicated to a wonderful topic of resource sharing. As in
the real life resources during networking are very limited. Say we have
a pie, and everyone wants a piece from it. Of course, the first one who
finds the pie can take the whole thing as a piece (of course if one will not
be conscience-stricken). That is what we do not want to allow. All the
algorithms which we discuss in this thesis are aiming at the fair division
of the pie. In one case we give the same instruction to everyone to follow,
i.e. robots slice a piece according to a rule. After that we invite people,
who love pies, to choose freely the amount of a piece to slice. How much
they will decide to cut from the pie? If after cutting one pie we will get
another with same number of people, will they change the desired size of a
slice? And further more, imagine that there are a lot of tables with a lot of
pies on every. A person after slicing a pie on one table may go to another
table. When I see a few known people at my table and a few newcomers,
how would I decide on the size of a piece to slice? Tough question, and this
thesis exactly about it.
The interesting topic of “pie slicing for robots” was initially suggested
to me in University of Kuopio by Prof. Martti Penttonen. It was called
Backoff protocol and I was asked to do it in batches for parallel comput-
ing. Prof. Evsey Morozov from my former Petrozavodsk State University
helped me with theoretical background related to the Backoff protocols -
Queueing Theory. With successful study of standard Backoff protocol, I
failed to study batches: my short-term grant run out and I was looking
for a job. That was the moment when I have found a job at the Helsinki
Institute for Information Technology, Networking Research group, leaded
by Prof. Andrei Gurtov. Prof. Andrei Gurtov introduced to me a lot of
new topics including the Denial-of-Service attacks and Overlays, which in
a way still the same “pie slicing” problem as before, but with a different
restrictions. The fruitful discussions in the group with other researchers,
including Andrey Khurri, Boris Nechaev, Dmitry Kuptsov, Miika Komu,
Dr. Dmitry Korzun, Dr. Pekka Nikander, Tatiana Polishchuk, gave me a
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lot of new ideas about the topics. Moreover, with collaboration with Rus-
sian Academy of Science, Karelian Research Center, Institute of Applied
Mathematics and personally with Prof. Vladimir Mazalov, and Dr. Igor
Falko, I have found an interesting field - the Game Theory. Now, changing
robots to the people who slice pies by own well thought-out decisions with
egoistic will to eat as much of the pie as possible we get absolutely new
problems, which shows own interesting solutions. Later, with such wide
research field, with a lot of problems and criteria for study, I was accepted
as a PhD student at University of Helsinki with Prof. Jussi Kangasharju
as my scientific advisor. In the University of Helsinki I was able to finally
finish the “pie slicing” problem, which I was thinking of during last four
years.
I would like to thank all the people without whom this work was hardly
possible. First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Andrei Gurtov, who gave
me the topics to study and supported the study during the working time.
I would like to thank my scientific advisor Prof. Jussi Kangasharju who
helped me to prepare the thesis. I would like to thank Prof. Evsey Mo-
rozov and Prof. Vladimir Mazalov who helped me with the theory behind
the studying topics a lot. I would like to thank Prof. Martti Penttonen
for taking me to the University of Kuopio, and guiding me during early
time. Additionally, I would like to thank all the researchers whom I was
collaborating with: Andrey Khurri, Boris Nechaev, Dmitry Kuptsov, Mi-
ika Komu, Dr. Dmitry Korzun, Dr. Pekka Nikander, Tatiana Polishchuk,
Dr. Igor Falko. Undoubtedly, I would like to thank reviewers of my thesis
for their reviews and comments Prof. Sabine Wittevrongel and Dr. Kon-
stantin Avrachenkov and I would like to thank my future opponent Prof.
Leon Petrosjan for the will to be my opponent. Of course, I would like
to thank my good friends who were supporting me all the time first of all
my Dell desktop PC and my Lenovo notebook, the latter is especially was
helpful in the business trips.
Finally, I would like to thank people who were supporting me from
behind. I would like to thank my wife Elena Lukyanenko for all the support,
my father Sergei Lukyanenko, my mother Natalia Lukyanenko and brother
Artem Lukyanenko. All of them helped me a lot during my studies and
life.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we outline what problems this thesis is dedicated to and
what area of research it covers. We also describe how we complete the
research and what tools/equipment we are using for that purpose. After
that we give a summary of the main contributions of our work and conclude
it with the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Research area/problem
In this work we are studying the major problems and tasks of today’s
Internet architecture under the assumptions of tomorrow’s evolution. A
lot of similar work in the field is dedicated to future Internet architecture,
and is based on the performance and processes that are taking place in
it. These works try to predict future problems and suggests methods to
evade the most significant threats in the future Internet. Some protocols
and algorithms that were designed for the Internet decades ago are not as
applicable for the new technology trends, as they are supposed to be. The
main idea of this work is to add the existence of new problems to these
protocols in order to evolve them to a new level.
The new threats that have arisen so far and that we are concerned about
include congestion control for public resources, denial-of-service attacks
and security. Everything contains questions on fairness among participants
and defense against misbehavior of malicious parties. Technologies that in
some sense are related to these problems are overlay algorithms (structured
Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) and unstructured), Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) congestion algorithms, medium access methods (including
backoff algorithm), publish/subscribe techniques. All those are united by
the terms of fair multi-user resource-sharing problems. Multi-user resource-
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sharing problems are the threats and problems where a common resource
is exploited and, thus, shared among many users in a concurrent way. In
this thesis multi-user resource-sharing problems include:
i. Backoff protocol — a series of stations share a medium on the physi-
cal layer. Messages are primarily sent simply by broadcast of signals.
Concurrent broadcasting corrupts the signals on the physical layer.
ii. Denial-of-service attack or congestion problem is a threat when one
point of the Internet may refuse to process messages or processes them
with low probability because of overload (exhaustion of resources).
iii. Overlays problems — problems, where resources are not placed into
one point, instead they are spread among the network nodes, which
are consumers and contributors at the same time.
Summarizing, we are studying a series of resource-sharing problems among
many users in the scope of existing network technologies under assumptions
of future networking trends.
1.2 Own approach
To study these different problems, we use well-known techniques of math-
ematical analysis: queueing theory and game theory. Those techniques
evolved during different periods of time, and in a sense the game theory
is a more novel tool for networking than the queueing theory. Thus, for
defined problems we introduce two (in some cases non-intersecting) ways
of thinking. For the first one, we assume that everyone in the network
honestly wants to make the system work in the most optimal way (the
system itself may define the optimality and the participants simply doing
the instructions of the system — protocols). For the second one, we give
the participants free will to decide (bounded only by our definition of the
possible strategies) what strategy to follow. Based on that for the men-
tioned problems we give the two measures: optimality, in the sense of the
whole system, and equilibrium, i.e., how a participant positions itself in the
system. Positions we measure as negative, neutral and positive: the first
hampers the system, the second does not affect it, and the last one helps
it.
Based on the mathematical theory we suggest a series of extensions
for existing protocols where they lead to some achievements, and introduce
new protocols where it is needed. These protocols let us deal with problems
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of shared resources among many users and the theory itself gives us the
metrics to measure how these algorithms behave under the problems.
To support our theoretical analysis and suggested algorithms, we em-
ploy simulations, which show the behavior of the different protocols for the
problems defined and studied. For this purpose, we use a set of simulation
tools that are widely used in the field for model evaluations and study, in-
cluding NS–3 for wireless models, OMNeT++ for Denial-of-service attacks
and BRITE as a realistic topology generator tool. We, of course, are not
able to fully support the theory with simulations in the sense of selection
of all possible strategies for parties (mostly those are infinite), however, we
do analyze the radical and commonly used ones. Additionally, we produce
some implementations in real protocols.
1.3 Contributions
As was said, in this work we introduce a methodology and suggest a set of
algorithms, which are based on criteria of optimality. We address a series of
problems on different layers with these algorithms and methods and present
required evaluation in order to support our results and conclusions.
For a backoff protocol, we produce the analysis in terms of queueing
theory. We present a general form of backoff protocol, which is unifying
many forms of backoff schemes to one generalization. For that generaliza-
tion we solve the optimality problem in slot number and, later, introduce a
model for optimization in continuous time space. As an extension to that
model we introduce a class of Matrix Adaptive Backoff protocols (MAB)
and reversed MAB (RMAB). As the new models differ from our gener-
alized backoff scheme only in distribution over states, we present a theo-
retical analysis for searching such states. We assume that the new MAB
and RMAB models will increase fairness among participants of a shared
medium network, in the sense of amount of sent data, among the par-
ties. The simulation results support our assumption. Finally, we study the
backoff scheme in terms of selfish behavior of end stations. It is shown that
the backoff problem has undesirable performance with selfish end stations
involved, however, we show that there exist advanced schemes to neglect
the selfishness, i.e. schemes to make end stations work optimally for the
system.
For Denial-of-Service attacks we suggest two schemes to deal with mis-
behaving stations. The first scheme deals with spoofing identity attacks,
i.e. an attack where attacking nodes send messages with forged IP ad-
dresses, thus the victim-server is not able to use the history of interactions
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with this identity in order to punish or encourage it. For such situations we
present a novel queueing policy — Most Knocked First Served (MKFS), in-
stead of the classical First-In-First-Out (FIFO) policy. The new algorithm
allows good nodes to fight for the right to be served on the server. This
scheme is supported by numerical analysis and evaluation on NS-3 simula-
tor, which shows excellent performance of the MKFS algorithm. For the
second scheme, as the first algorithm deals with spoofing, we present an al-
gorithm which deals with an attack, when unforged addresses are involved.
The addresses are real and, hence, the server may start to deal with clients
based on a history of interactions. For such an algorithm, we introduce a
reputation scheme and reputation metric that allows to make end stations
behave well in the scheme. Misbehaving nodes get server resources in a very
restricted amount. For such a scheme we present theoretical analysis based
on the principle maximum of Pontryagin and evaluate in an OMNeT++
simulator in order to conform the analysis. Both algorithms support ex-
tensions in the form of distributed algorithms. In continuation, we present
the overlay use for a more secured way of the public address presentation
(hi3 scheme). With that technique the server may separate parties whom it
gives the information on its location, and, thus, make the denial-of-service
attack harder to implement.
For overlays in general, we introduce a reputation scheme that allows
stations to record the history of their interactions in one-dimensional vari-
able — reputation (or probability). The scheme was evaluated in order to
check that it makes the participants to behave when they want to gain the
most. The end station behavior was studied as a control theory problem
first, where only one player maximizes its profit (this analysis is valid under
the assumption of many players’ interaction) and secondly it was studied as
a two-player game theory problem (this analysis is valid under the assump-
tion of few player interactions). For both analyses an optimal trajectory
for the players was constructed. However, the first one is given in a more
explicit form compared to the second one. Additionally, we show how and
under what conditions this scheme deals with free-riding or whitewashing
problems of overlay algorithms.
As our contribution, we suggest these new algorithms and techniques
under an assumption of future Internet use. These schemes imply problems
of many user interactions, fairness among interacting users and additional
end-user behavior control schemes for the multi-user resource-shared prob-
lem. We believe that these schemes will be asked for in next-generation
networks, the ones that the Internet will evolve to.
The current thesis is based on a series of reviewed publications, where
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the author was taking part as the first author in all of them, except one.
The author contributed the most in these publications. An exception is the
hi3 publication [42], where the author made a study of the i3 protocol and
implemented the hi3 scheme for a HIPL realization of HIP.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis overview is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will give the
necessary background for the thesis with more detailed discussion on the
technologies and techniques we are using. Chapter 3 contains the summary
of our published papers with a list of the main results and discussions on
the results achieved and the significance of them. Lastly, in Chapter 4 we
discuss future work and conclude the overview of the thesis. The overview
is followed by the original publications.
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Chapter 2
Literature review and background
In this chapter we will give the necessary background for the field of study
and overview of the main literature related to that background. First of
all, we are going to formulate the main threats and problems of the current
Internet and networking communications, which we are going to deal with.
After that, we will mention various aspects and theories, based on which we
are looking on the problems, these include Markov Chain Theory and Game
Theory. We introduce methodologies based on these aspects and used to
solve formulated network-related problems. Then, we take a deeper look at
the backoff protocol that is used in medium-access control schemes, with an
overview of the history of research and survey on gained results so far. After
that we list related technologies that are parts of future Internet topics, and
mention how they relate to our research. Lastly, we list network simulation
and evaluation tools which are widely used for networking analysis.
2.1 Internet and network communication prob-
lems
During recent decades Internet grew from a small educational university
network to a global communication network that connects all parts of the
world into one informational domain [64]. It became a part and parcel of
day-to-day life, and so did the accompanying problems. At the beginning,
during the development stage some of the threats were not thought of at
all and some of them were not considered to be of great importance to
the technology. Now, as time has shown most of those problems need
solutions in today’s Internet and are reconsidered as of great importance
to the Internet.
As we were able to observe, during previous years the growth of the
11
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technology in the number of users and amount of resources leads to public
appearance of predicted, but hidden problems or even leads to new, unfore-
seen problems popping up. As an example one can see (i) transition IPv4
from class to classless CIDR [34], when the number of networks were not
enough to satisfy all demand, (ii) TCP congestion collapse [49] occurred in
1986, when throughput between two nodes dropped from 32 Kbps down to
40 bps, (iii) Denial-of-Service attack [81], when a malicious user artificially
creates congestion at some end-point and, hence, produces denial-of-service
to process requests from benign users at the node, and so on. The history
of the Internet has a full set of examples that shows how the growth of the
technology produces new threats and shows new sides of the solved ones.
For all mentioned problems, and for problems that have not been men-
tioned, but are found in today’s Internet, a set of all kinds of solutions
were introduced. Some of them fully solve the problems (as far as context
will not change again, as we saw in history), some of them partly solve
the problems, meaning that the solutions are hardly applicable or are not
easy to deploy. The examples give us to understand that any solution of
the problems is fully dependent on the context (i.e., number of users, re-
sources and technology). Thus, we study the problems from various angles
to make the study of them multifaceted and, hence, with more predictable
properties for the future.
Here, we are going to focus on a subset of today’s Internet and communi-
cation networking problems, namely multi-user resource sharing problems,
which we are addressing in the following chapters.
2.1.1 Congestion control and multiple-access channels
The term congestion control is mainly applicable for two sets of schemes:
one is TCP congestion control and the other is a mechanism to deal with
collisions on a shared medium — the Medium Access Control (MAC) sub-
layer of the OSI model. Historically, those were developed in parallel; the
first one came with the development of TCP, when the threat of conges-
tion collapse was considered serious [30,49,82]. The second one came from
development of the ALOHA protocol [12, 14], and then the Ethernet pro-
tocol [79].
In spite of the fact that these schemes are dealing with a common in
spirit congestion problem, the actual technology has important distinctions
and dictates different solutions. In TCP, packets from one source are sent
in bunches and congestion there means that some of the bunch will be lost,
while congestion in medium means that every station sends only one frame
at a time and all (or most) sent frames in the network collide (a frame
2.1 Internet and network communication problems 13
is a message of the MAC layer). Collision in medium is on the physical
layer meaning physical damage of part of the signal. On the other hand,
TCP collisions are mostly happening when some intermediate node has an
overflown buffer, then the node deliberately discards the packets. One can
find more details on comparison of TCP, for example, in [30].
Our main focus during the work will be on MAC schemes to deal with
collisions implemented in the following two protocols IEEE 802.11 or Wi-
Fi [47] and IEEE 802.3 or Ethernet [46]. More precisely we are going to
study the core of these standards — the backoff protocol, that gives the core
principle on how to deal with and avoid collisions.
2.1.2 Selfishness
In the previous section we talked about congestion control in terms of
protocol work. But what will happen if the users start to select or adjust
the protocols based on their own preferences? If one is free to select which
congestion control to adopt then in some cases the aggressive congestion
control (or neglect of any congestion control, just selfish bulks of data) will
be selected.
Selfishness becomes a more and more significant aspect to take into
account, when a new protocol is designed. It was shown by recent de-
velopment of the network communication field that selfishness of nodes in
some cases cannot be ignored. The adaptation of Game Theory for this
problem was widely introduced recently. The selfishness of nodes itself can
be formulated using some notions of the theory. The formulation and the
application of the game theory for resource-sharing problems will be made
in the following sections.
In general, without any reference to the theory, an optimal protocol
is designed based on the assumption that all users of the system work
accordingly. However, in practice it is hard to restrict users to choose only
a necessary strategy over others, and not to deviate from it. Mainly these
assumptions are produced by the hardness of the end user to change the
actual protocol, although some adjustments are in any case available for
the end user. The adjustments that the user may produce, can affect the
protocol greatly or can be inconspicuous for the system. This fully depends
on the protocol, and a designer of the protocol needs to take into account
the trade-offs of system optimality and individual selfishness.
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2.1.3 Denial-of-service attack
A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS) or Distributed Denial-of-Service attack
(DDoS) [81] becomes a more dangerous threat with development of the
Internet as a political and economical tool. Internet websites (or servers in
general) are used as fundamental business platforms, for example as Inter-
net shops [18] or auctions [28]; and it is also used for delivery of political
news or mass media information. All these are potential targets for mali-
cious deeds both as for mercenary ends as well as for simple fun. In general,
DoS is an attack on an Internet node, the main purpose of which is to make
the resource unaccessible for benign users making it perform as if it is heav-
ily congested or out-of-service. In this sense the DoS attack resembles the
congestion of a network: if the node has the same amount of benign users
it will be congested in the same way. However, the crowd is created on the
server artificially and, hence, it does not bring profit for the end system, it
only increases maintenance costs and affects the satisfaction of service for
the clients.
The DoS attack becomes feasible mostly because of the original concept
of the Internet, main principles of which are (i) delivery of packets is based
on the best effort basis and (ii) there is no global control on the operation
level [64]. Without check for the original source address any node can insert
any packet in the network and it will be delivered to the destination node
without any global validation for the source address and for legitimacy of
the traffic (in the following sections we will discuss publishing/subscription
techniques). Based on it, the IP address spoofing becomes one of the serious
tools for performing DoS attack on a server. Recent trends show new
techniques to perform defense mechanisms. Mainly the defense is based on
(i) source address validation schemes, e.g. [66, 105],
(ii) classification of the traffic, e.g. [45],
(iii) pushback mechanisms, when a server informs the closest routers about
packets which should be dropped, after that the routers inform second-
level routers, and so on, e.g. [48],
(iv) traceback-marking mechanisms, where routers put some mark into up-
stream packets and, thus, the server after some period of time receiv-
ing these packets may construct an attacking graph, e.g. [40,62,83,99]
for some discussion on ineffectiveness see [102],
(v) filtering of packets based on hop-counting [50] or by the routers’ de-
fense line [106,107], sometimes with the help of benign clients [103].
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However, those techniques are still in the deployment or pending stage
and they do not seem to be deployed in the near future. Additionally to
spoofing IP, botnets produce a real threat; the sizes of some found botnets
are huge, more than 10 million poisoned computers, [51] and even without
spoofing they may produce heavy attacks on the end-nodes. All these and
some more make the DDoS attacks a threat worth attention and study.
2.1.4 Confidentiality
The last problem we are going to address is confidentiality. Confidentiality
is an ambiguous term itself. We define it as a restriction on the network
resource availability and access only for authorized users, whom we checked
and gave the right to access the resource. In other words for every piece
of data we divide all users into two groups: ones who have access to the
data and ones who do not. Even the request to access the resource can be
a subject for confidentiality.
As we have seen in the previous section, the DDoS attack is in some
sense achievable because everyone can freely see what address the destina-
tion host has and send a packet directly to it. Hence, there is no confiden-
tiality of the resource’s location, nor the confidentiality of packets’ delivery.
Another example is SPAM [27] when anyone can freely send an advertise-
ment by e-mail or instant messenger, for example. In that case there is no
confidentiality of the users’ IDs, when there is no method to separate ID
access for authorized and unauthorized users.
In the following sections we are going to talk about Host Identity Pro-
tocol (HIP), overlays and publish/subscribe techniques that give a cause
to some rethinking of the design of the Internet in terms of confidentiality
and provides the address/location splitting.
2.2 Markov chains and Queueing theory
In this section we are going to give the basic definitions and models start-
ing from “what is the probability space” and ending with the “ergodicity
for Markov chains”. The same definitions may be found in any book on
the theory of probability. The main theorems on potential functions and
ergodicity are most important for the work and those we repeat with our
own interpretation from Meyn’s and Tweedie’s excellent book [80]. For
the Queueing Theory we will also outline only brief principles and defini-
tions because it is a vast topic, for details on different models and analysis
principles see the book of Asmussen [19].
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2.2.1 General formulations
Let us have some probability space 〈Ω, F,P〉, where sample space Ω is a non-
empty set of elementary events, F — is a σ-algebra on Ω, i.e., is a collection
of all combinations of events from Ω, and, finally, P — is a probabilistic
measure on σ-algebra F, which measures all possible events on [0, 1] space.
The sample space Ω is fully based on an experiment, and outcomes of the
experiment can be expressed using one element of Ω. F is σ-algebra on Ω if
(a) F contains the whole sample space: Ω ∈ F.
(b) F is closed under complements: If A ∈ F, then A ∈ F, where A = Ω \A.
(c) F is closed under countable unions: If An ∈ F for all n, then ∪∞n=1An ∈ F
and ∩∞n=1An ∈ F.
Finally, mapping P : F→ [0, 1] is a probability measure on F if
(a) P(A) ≥ 0 for any A ∈ F.
(b) P(Ω) = 1.
(c) If a set of events An ∈ F is pairwise disjoint, i.e., Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅ for any
i 6= j, then
P
( ∞⋃
n=1
An
)
=
∞∑
n=1
P(An).
ξ is called a random variable if it is a measurable function that maps
sample space on real number axis ξ : Ω→ R, i.e., if preimage ξ−1(B) = {ω :
ξ(ω) ∈ B} for any Borel set B ∈ B is an element of σ-algebra F. We say that
ξ is doing measurable mapping of 〈Ω, F〉 onto 〈B,B〉. For random variable
ξ probability measure is defined as Pξ(B) = P(ξ ∈ B) and distribution
function is defined as Fξ(x) = P(ξ < x), i.e., when B = (−∞, x).
For random variable ξ we define expectation and dispersion (or variance)
as
Eξ =
∫
Ω
ξ(ω)P(dω) =
∫
B
xP(dx) =
∫
B
xdF(x),
and
Dξ = E(ξ − Eξ)2,
where the integration operation is Lebesgue integral.
Events A1, A2, . . . An ∈ F for any n ≥ 2 are independent if and only
if P(A1 ∩ A2 ∩ . . . An) = P(A1)P(A2) . . .P(An). In the same way random
variables X0, X1, . . . , Xn are called independent random variables if and
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only if events {ξ1 ∈ B1}, {ξ2 ∈ B2}, . . . , {ξn ∈ Bn} are independent events
for any Borel sets B1,B2, . . . ,Bn, i.e.
P(ξ1 ∈ B1, ξ2 ∈ B2, . . . , ξn ∈ Bn) = P(ξ1 ∈ B1)P(ξ2 ∈ B2) . . .P(ξn ∈ Bn).
We define conditional probability for events A,B ∈ F as P(A|B) =
P(A∩B)
P(B) . Analogously, we define conditional probability for random variables
ξ, η as P(ξ|η) = P(ξ,η)P(ξ) .
A random variable ξ is called discrete if for a finite or countable set of
points {xn}n≥0 the following holds∑
n≥0
Pξ(xn) = 1,
if it is not possible then a random variable is called continuous or mixed.
Any point from the set {xn}n≥0 above is called a state, while the whole set
of points under the equation is called the state space. We will refer to it as
X.
2.2.2 Markov chains and ergodicity
The following construction will help us to study trends of random variables
with discrete time. Let us have a sequence of discrete random variables
{Xt}∞t≥0, the sequence forms a Markov chain if
P(Xt = j|Xt−1 = i,Xt−2 = kt−2, . . . ,X1 = k1, X0 = k0) =
P(Xt = j|Xt−1 = i) ≡ pij(t), (2.1)
for t ≥ 1, sometimes it is interpreted as time or step. Equation (2.1) is
called a Markov property, it indicates that the probability to be in state j
at the moment t depends on the previous state (at the moment t− 1), and
independent from states before previous (t − 2, . . . , 0) with given previous
state (at the moment t− 1).
Values of i, j are called states and all possible states form the state
space (as we defined above), however, for convenience, we will enumerate all
states starting from 1 (i.e., X = {1, 2, . . . , n}), as the random variables are
discrete, the number of states is countable or finite and such enumeration
is allowed. For simplicity we define conditional probabilities 2.1 at time t
as pij(t). The notation pij(t) is also called a transition probability from
state i to state j for t timesteps. As one can see it is possible to represent
them as a graph with vertices as states i, j and weighted edges as pij(t).
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For any state we define the initial distribution to be in that state pi0i =
P(X0 = i), where
∑
i pii = 1, or in vector form pi
0 = P(X0). The transition
probabilities can be viewed as a matrix (countable or finite) P (t), where an
element in row i column j of matrix P (t) is equal to pij(t). If we have initial
probability pi0 and the transition probabilities P (t) then the probability of
a random variable at any moment of time to be in some state can be found
using a matrix form
P(Xt) = pi
0
t∏
i=1
P (i). (2.2)
If transition probabilities do not depend on time t then the Markov
chain is called homogeneous Markov chain, P = P (i), for any i. In that
case equation (2.2) may be written as
P(Xt) = pi
0P t(i). (2.3)
We follow the definitions from Meyn’s and Tweedie’s book [80] for irre-
ducibility, aperiodicity and ergodicity of Markov chains.
Definition (Irreducibility). Markov chain {Xt}∞t≥0 is called irreducible Markov
chain if for any i, j ∈ X exists t such that pij(t) > 0.
Definition (Aperiodicity). An irreducible Markov chain {Xt}∞t≥0 on a count-
able space X is called aperiodic, if d(x) = 1, i ∈ X, where d(x) = gcd{t ≥
1 : pii(t) > 0}.
Definition (Occupation time). For any set A ∈ B, the occupation time ηA
is the number of visits by {Xt}∞t≥0 to A after time zero, and is given by
ηA ≡
∞∑
t=1
I{Xt ∈ A},
where indicator function I is defined as following
I(A) =
{
1, if A
0, otherwise.
Definition (First return and hitting time). For any set A ∈ B, the vari-
ables
τA ≡ min{t ≥ 1 : Xt ∈ A, X0 ∈ A} (2.4)
σA ≡ min{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ A} (2.5)
are called the first return and hitting times on A, respectively.
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Definition (Recurrence). The state i is called a recurrent state if E[ηi] =
∞, i.e., the expected number of visits to the state is infinite. If every state
is recurrent, the chain is called recurrent.
Definition (Positive recurrence). The state i is called a positive recurrent
state if E[τi] < ∞, i.e. the expected return time to the state is finite. If
every state is positive recurrent, the chain is called positive recurrent.
Definition (Transience). The state i is called a transient state if E[ηi] <
∞, i.e. the expected number of returns to the state is finite. If every state
is transient, the chain is called transient.
Definition (Invariance). For homogeneous Markov chain {Xt}∞t≥0 a proba-
bility distribution pi is called invariant if pi = piP , i.e. one step of transition
matrix does not change the distribution.
Definition (Positivity). Homogeneous Markov chain {Xt}∞t≥0 is called a
positive chain if it is irreducible and admits an invariant probability distri-
bution pi.
Definition (Ergodicity). Markov chain {Xt}∞t≥0 is called an ergodic chain
if it is positive recurrent and aperiodic (same for a single state).
Theorem 1 (Theorem 8.3.4 from [80]). If {Xt}∞t≥0 is irreducible, then it
is either recurrent or transient.
Next we will give Theorem 14.0.1 from [80] on potential function.
Theorem 2 (Potential function theorem). Suppose that the chain {Xt}∞t≥0
is irreducible and aperiodic, and let f ≥ 1 be a function on X. Then the
following conditions are equivalent:
1. The chain is positive recurrent with invariant probability measure pi
and
pi(f) ≡
∫
pi(dx)f(x) <∞.
2. There exists some finite set C ∈ B such that
sup
x∈C
Ex
[
τC−1∑
n=0
f(Xn)]
]
<∞.
The last theorem was very useful for analysis of the backoff protocol by
Hastad et al. [44]. In this thesis we will often refer to the stability of Markov
chains, in many cases it means that the corresponding chain is ergodic.
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2.2.3 Markov process and embedded Markov chains
Previously we defined discrete time Markov chains (as we used a countable
number of random variables). It is also possible to define continuous-time
Markov chain or Markov process with discrete state space equivalently to the
previous definition. Let us have a random process {X(t) = X(t, ω)}t≥0 (t
now continuous) for some probability space 〈Ω, F,P〉, then X(t) is a Markov
process if for any time moments t0 < t2 < · · · < tn ≤ t
P(X(t) = x(t)|X(tn) = x(tn), X(tn−1) = x(tn−1), . . . , X(t0) = x(t0)) =
P(X(t) = x(t)|X(tn) = x(tn)). (2.6)
In spite of the fact that continuous-time Markov chains are seen very
often (for example, calls on a telephone station are sometimes assumed to
be a Poisson process), it is easier to work with discrete-time Markov chains.
If we define a new Markov chain based only on the moments when a station
changes the states, then we will be able to get a discrete-time Markov chain
associated with the Markov process. The new Markov chain is called an
embedded Markov chain. If the new chain is ergodic then we are able to
find its stationary distribution, which in turn says about the probability
to be in each state of the original Markov process. Multiplying them by
average time we will get the average time to stay in each state. It is used,
for example, in queueing theory when the Markov process is studied using
Markov chains based on the number of messages in the queue.
2.2.4 Queueing theory and average service time
In computer science, queueing theory makes an important mathematical ba-
sis for analyzing queueing systems. By queueing systems we mean systems
that have hierarchically (and sometimes cyclically) connected processes, the
work of one is dependent on a set of others. Any of such processes may
need to wait for the previous one to finish its job before receiving data to
process or the next one before sending new data to it. The connections
between processes often have the forms of queues (first in first out) and a
piece of data that is stored in these queues is a message. Any process has
a service procedure and the process starts to serve whenever it has at least
one message in the input queue, it also may produce an output stream of
served messages. Based on that, in queueing theory, an important role is
played by the number of messages in the queues and the time that they
spend in the queue.
In classical queueing theory (for example, [55]) the input and the service
processes are often defined as Poisson processes with parameters λ and
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λ
Queue
Server
µ
Figure 2.1: Basic queueing system with input process (parameter λ) and
output process (parameter µ). Server policy is to serve only one message
at a time.
µ, respectively. Let random variable ηt show the number of events that
happened up to time t, we say that ηt is a Poisson process with parameter
λ if the following conditions hold:
(a) P(ηt+h − ηt = 0) = 1− λh+ o(h),
(b) P(ηt+h − ηt = 1) = λh+ o(h),
(c) P(ηt+h − ηt ≥ 2) = o(h),
where o(h) - is little-o of h. The definition gives us P(ηt = x) =
e−λt(λt)x
x! .
The Poisson distribution also have a memoryless property:
P(ηt > x+ y|ηt > x) = P(ηt > y).
Based on the input and service processes an embedded Markov chain
can be used - the number of messages in the queue. In the simplest case,
as shown in Figure 2.1, λ < µ is a sufficient condition for stability (that
the number of messages in the queue is finite) for the Markov chain. For
such a process waiting time can also be introduced, which is the time that
messages which came at random time wait in the input queue before being
served. Waiting time depends on the size of the current queue and some-
times is called unfinished work. The process itself can be formulated in
terms of renewal and regenerative processes (for details on the processes,
see [80]). Average waiting time is fully defined by the input random pro-
cess and service random process. Stability in that case is achieved if the
average waiting time is less than infinity (in the simplest case and some
more complicated it is again achieved if λ < µ is fulfilled). This value is of
great interest for us, because reduction of the average service time makes
the system perform in a more optimal way.
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2.3 Game Theory for communication problems
In this section we are going to talk about game theory and its application to
communication problems. First of all we will give the main definitions of the
theory and will give one important example of game theory in matrix form.
However, we are not interested in matrix games and in the following section
we will give necessary background for differential games. Differential and
iterated games are very useful when the profit of a player heavily depends
on the sequence of strategies the player chooses in time. Here we are going
to formulate briefly differential games and methods to solve them as we are
formulating some communication problems in a differential form in the next
chapter. More information on these kinds of games can be found in [20,33].
Differential games in some sense are a generalization of control theory and
maximum principle of Pontryagin [84]. This famous result from the control
theory is utilized a lot in the differential games. Lastly, we will show how
game theory is used in network communications and what results it shows
in the field.
2.3.1 General formulation
We define a game as a combination of three sets (see [33]):
(i) Set of players i ∈ P, which for simplicity are labeled by a set {1, 2, . . . , I}.
(ii) Pure-strategy space Si for each player i, where si ∈ Si is the strategies
of the player i.
(iii) Payoff functions ui which gives a player the income based on the
selected strategies (ui(s), s = (s1, s2, . . . , sI)).
I.e., a game in a normal form is a combination of these Γ = 〈P, S, J〉, where
P = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} and J = {u1, u2, . . . , um}. Every
player receives income based on what strategy that player chooses and what
pure strategies are chosen by others. The chosen element of Si for player
i (si ∈ Si) is called a pure strategy. We also define mixed strategies σi as
the probability distribution over pure strategies (it may be discrete or a
continuous depending on the space), i.e., it is some probability measure on
Si for player i. By σ−i we define strategies of all players, except player i,
i.e., σ−i = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . σI}.
Definition (Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative game). Let us have a
game Γ = 〈P, S, J〉 then a mixed-strategy profile σ∗i is a Nash equilibrium if,
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C D
C 1/1 10/0
D 0/10 6/6
Table 2.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome table. The strategy space is to co-
operate (C) or defect (D). Rows show strategies of the first player, columns
of the second.
for all players i,
ui(σ
∗
i , σ
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, σ∗−i) for all si ∈ Si.
One of the important examples of games is called Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Two players (“prisoners”) have two strategies: cooperate (C) with another
player, or defect (D), testify against another. They cannot communicate
with each other. The matrix of the games is shown in Table 2.1. If both
cooperate with each other they will receive minimal punishment, if one de-
fects, another remain with cooperating strategy, the one who defects will be
set free, while the other will receive severe penalty. If both players defect,
then both of them will get “middle” punishment. For both players to defect
is the Nash equilibrium in form of pure strategies: (D,D), but it is clearly
not optimal in sum u1(D,D) + u2(D,D) < u1(C,C) + u2(C,C). However,
the game changes when it has iterated form. Based on the behavior of an-
other, a prisoner may punish the opponent for defecting, while cooperating
when another player cooperates. The formulated game in iterated form has
a lot of applications in network communications.
2.3.2 Differential games
In order to define a game in differential form, as previously, let us have I
players and I pure strategies – “actions” or “controls” a(t) = {a1(t), . . . , aI(t)},
where ai(t) ∈ Si for every t. Additionally for every player we define “co-
ordinate” or “trajectory” – x(t) = {x1(t), . . . , xn(t)}. These controls and
trajectories are connected into a dynamic system x˙i(t) = fi(t, x(t), a(t))
with initial condition x(0) = x0. A player may variate only controls a(t)
(possible variations are strategy space), while variables x(t) are fully de-
fined by the system above, thus controls are selected from the set Si ∈ Rmi .
The trajectories xi(t) take all values of the dynamic system without any
restrictions (in case such restrictions are needed a more complicated form
of the formulation and solution available in the literature, for control the-
ory see [84]). Based on the current coordinate and action a player receives
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gain ui =
∫ T
0 gi(t, x(t), a(t))dt + q(T, x(T )) i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, which sums up
intermediate profit gi depending on the trajectories and actions, and final
profit q that depends on the final position. We also predefined the time
required for game T .
For such systems Hamiltonians are defined using costate variables λi =
{λi1, . . . , λin} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , I}:
Hi(t, λ, x, u) ≡ gi(t, x(t), a(t)) +
∑
j
λij(t)fj(t, x(t), a(t)).
Based on which co-state variables and optimal controls (i.e., Nash equilib-
rium) are defined by the following system:
λ˙ij(t) = −∂Hi(t,λ,x
∗,a∗)
∂xj
,
λij(T ) =
∂qi(T,x
∗)
∂xj
,
a∗i (t) = arg maxai
Hi(t, λ, x
∗, a).

The previous results follow from the maximum principle of Pontryagin
(in some literature the minimum principle) and in the case when I = 1
it is a problem of control theory for which the maximum principle was
developed. The above is applied under a set of restrictions on functions:
the functions f ,g and q are continuously differentiable in x and continuous
in t and a.
2.3.3 Application to the networking
Recently application of the Game Theory to the networking analysis erupted
a number of results on the known protocols. For example, analysis of TCP
games, where the players are allowed to control parameters α, β – the addi-
tive increase value and multiplicative decrease of AIMD scheme [15] shows
that corresponding Nash equilibrium in many cases is undesirable. Another
work [35] shows that the current resource-sharing mechanisms in Internet
either encourage selfish behavior, or are oblivious to it. Analysis in [108]
supports previous results. Everything is based on the assumption of coop-
erative behavior of the network nodes. However, selfish routing under some
models and conditions [85,86,93] still may have close-to-optimal behavior.
These analyses show that in most cases the Internet is vulnerable to self-
ish behavior of end-nodes. Some algorithms, though, propose methods to
achieve fairness in such environments [110].
Another trend in modern network communications is to study incen-
tives that drive malicious users additionally with strategies and objectives,
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for example, in DDoS attacks [67]. Based on this knowledge game-based
defense mechanisms may be constructed, e.g., [75]. However, in many cases
the suggested algorithms are hard to implement as was discussed previously.
Another natural application of the Game Theory came to the overlay
system. It is most natural as in overlays the ordinary nodes provide a
control plane themselves. Feldman et al. [32] consider P2P systems, where
users provide service to each other, under the free-riding and whitewash-
ing set of strategies. In the work, they construct a model which adds
penalties to the users who free-ride in the system. Additionally, some re-
strictions are added for the newcomers in order to prevent whitewashing.
Under such restrictions the model shows higher performance compared to
a model without incentives. Another work of Mazalov et al. on P2P user
communication [77] is based on the auction principle: two players make
bids on how much they contribute, the winner is the one closest to some
value. The latter analysis again shows some non-trivial Nash equilibrium,
which the user may choose.
2.4 Backoff protocol
In this section we are going to describe the backoff protocol that is used
for congestion resolutions on the MAC layer in more details. The first of
the next chapter will be dedicated to optimization problems of the pro-
tocol, thus, we support this analysis with previous results and make the
comparisons of models and methods for analyzing.
2.4.1 Creation and design principle
The backoff scheme was introduced in ALOHAnet [12,59]. It was a network
that connects a set of university facilities on Hawaii to a central station and
later to the continental part of the USA through a satellite [13, 14]. For
example see Figure 2.2. There was introduced a constant backoff proto-
col (it was referred to as unslotted ALOHA), initially for communication
between terminals and then for satellite. For the ground users, it was as-
sumed that many of them are silent most of the time, while some active
users perform in a bursty manner, hence it was decided to give possibility
for a user to gain as much capacity of the channel as possible, instead of
the equal division of the channel among the users. In the satellite case,
the antenna on the ground and the satellite used the same medium — a
common radio frequency, hence, collisions can happen when both stations
send signals simultaneously. As the connection had very high latency, the
cost of data loss was huge. After a collision stations cannot start resending
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Figure 2.2: ALOHA network design principle. The main station (on the
left), communicates to remote university facilities (on the right) and to the
satellite through wireless connections.
data immediately or after some deterministic time period, as it will lead
to a collision once more with high probability. It has a prefixed number of
timeslots T from which stations select one random timeslot and countdown
to that time slot till the moment they try to resend data. As the scheme in-
troduces random numbers the probability of collision reduces and depends
fully on T and the number of active users.
Later, in 1973, Bob Metcalfe and David Boggs used the same idea of
backoff protocol to develop the Ethernet [79], a wired network, where sta-
tions can be easily tapped into to start communications (see Figure 2.3). It
did not utilize the constant backoff protocol anymore. It was named binary
exponential backoff (BEB) protocol or truncated binary exponential back-
off protocol. While in the original backoff that was used in ALOHA the
time slot had been chosen uniformly from constant value T , now the value
was sliding and was dependent on a prehistory of the current situation, i.e.
the number of uninterrupted collisions.
Let us define the number of collisions that happen in a row as i – we
name it backoff counter, then the protocol states the following. If i ≥ 16
discard the message, i.e., say to upper layers that an error has happened.
If i ≤ 10 then set Ti = 2i, otherwise (10 < i < 16) set Ti = 1024. Hence,
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Figure 2.3: An example of an Ethernet network consisting of two segments
connected by a hub. All data that a station transmits to the network
propagate from one segment of the network to another through this hub.
Attempt to send the message deferred 
by the selected period of time.
yes
no
no
yes
yes
no
based on the backoff counter.
Compute contention window
from the contention window.
Select random time to send uniformly 
Take a message from top of the queue.
Set backoff counter to 0.
Wait for messages.
in the input queue?
There is no messages 
Backoff counter is too big?
Increase backoff counter by 1.
Collision happened?
Figure 2.4: Backoff procedure is shown as a block diagram scheme.
every station checks the value i before an attempt to transmit a portion
of data (frame), based on that value the station decides to discard the
packet (and set i to zero) or, otherwise, use value Ti. If the station’s
choice is to use Ti it selects a timeslot which will be used to transmit data
uniformly from contention window (CW): [0, 1, . . . Ti − 1] and wait for the
timeslot. After that if a collision occurs the station increases i by one,
otherwise, if the message was sent successfully the station sets i to zero.
The backoff procedure without binding to any values and functions is shown
in Figure 2.4.
Previously we said that the CW size is computed by equation Ti = 2
i.
This backoff protocol version was named binary exponential backoff (BEB),
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as it grows with exponential speed and the factor is equal 2. It is widely
used, almost all standards that use the backoff protocol utilize it, however,
it is worth mentioning that the backoff protocol may be generalized, i.e.,
CW size is some function of i (Ti = g(i)). In literature we additionally meet
a linear version of the backoff protocol, where g(i) is a linear function of i,
and polynomial, when g(i) is a polynomial of i. In scheme in Figure 2.4 we
omitted the definition of the exact protocol view.
2.4.2 IEEE 802.11 modification
Initially, Ethernet used single thick coaxial cable, where collisions could
happen, and network hubs to connect together different cables. So it dic-
tated the use of backoff protocol as main part of Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) scheme. Later, the technol-
ogy evolved and Ethernet started to use more sophisticated devices and
cables (i.e., twisted pairs and switches). Now, the collisions do not seem to
be a great problem for Ethernet. However, recent decade showed a great
growth of wireless communications technology, which were predetermined
by miniaturization. As by the time Ethernet was very popular and success-
ful standard a similar scheme, namely, Carrier Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA), was suggested for congestion control in
wireless devices. The standard IEEE 802.11 [47] gives the specification for
this scheme.
The backoff protocol was also adopted in IEEE 802.11. However, it was
slightly different than that was used in Ethernet. Now, if i is the number
of successive collisions then Ti = CW02
i, where CW0 is initial contention
window, which is also used even if no collisions happen before. The number
of collisions before discard of the data frame was also changed, although
in most parts the backoff scheme remained as in Ethernet and also utilized
BEB scheme.
The standard IEEE 802.11 [47] suggests three coordination functions
which deal with collisions: Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), Point
Coordination Function (PCF), and Hybrid Coordination Function (HCF).
While access points utilize PCF for coordination, it in turn works above
DCF for contention control. Here we will talk mainly about DCF as the
fundamental part of collision resolution procedure. Minutely, DCF states
that every station in the IEEE 802.11 network has to wait special periods of
time, in order to avoid collisions. In basic scheme, after every transmission,
the receiver station has to wait Short Interframe Space (SIFS) before reply-
ing with an acknowledgement packet (ACK) or send/receive more advanced
frames. SIFS is the minimal gap between two consequent frames required
2.4 Backoff protocol 29
FHSS DSSS IR
Slot time 50 µs 20 µs 8 µs
SIFS time 28 µs 10 µs 10 µs
DIFS time 128 µs 50 µs 26 µs
Air propagation time 1 µs 1 µs 1 µs
CWmin 16 32 64
CWmax 1024 1024 1024
Table 2.2: Time settings and contention window limits for FHSS, DSSS
and IR versions of the IEEE 802.11 standard.
(i) for the receiver to switch from receiving state to sending and (ii) for the
sender to separate frames from each another. Other stations before attempt
to send should wait at least the DCF Interframe Space (DIFS) period of
time during which the network was idle. If a collision happens then the
backoff protocol is used, with the specified size for time slots. The minimal
size of the contention window (CW0) — CWmin and maximal — CWmax.
The standard IEEE 802.11 specifies different values for various modulation
principles. In Table 2.2 the values for Frequency-hopping spread spectrum
(FHSS), Direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and Infrared (IR) are
given.
In addition to the basic DCF scheme, a RTS/CTS scheme is introduced
in the standard. Whenever a station sends a message after waiting DIFS
period of idle time it may be collided with another. If the message is a
frame with full payload the whole data will be lost and information about
the collision will be known only after transmission of such a frame. This is
very costly for communication, thus, special “lightweight” frames ready-to-
send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) were suggested. Whenever a station
wants to send some data, it waits the required DIFS period and sends a
RTS frame instead of a full-payload frame. Another station after receiving
a RTS frame (addressed to the station) replies with a CTS frame after SIFS
period of time. Hence, all collisions happen with RTS/CTS frames, and are
almost collision-free in between. Additionally, the RTS/CTS scheme helps
to deal with the hidden station problem – when two stations not knowing
about the existence of each other communicate with one access point (AP).
They sense the network is idle, but AP may be in the communication phase
with another station, when a CTS frame comes from AP these stations will
know that AP will be busy for some period of time.
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2.4.3 Study of the protocol
Historically, queueing theory was the first way to look at the networking
problems from a mathematical perspective. Today it is partly replaced or
reconsidered based on game theory, which we are going to talk about at
the end of this section.
The study of the ALOHA protocol showed that the unslotted protocol
had the throughput γe−2γ , while the slotted one had γe−γ , where γ is the
average total arrival rate at the input [88]. It was considered that the
maximum number of active users on the ground may be 324 for the unslot-
ted (i.e. asynchronous) ALOHA protocol [12]. As for the slotted model,
for the unslotted model with an infinite user number it was shown that
the protocol is unstable. [90] The analysis utilized the study of transient
Markov chains and martingales. Other different studies were conducted on
the infinite ALOHA model. All of them, however, indicate instability for
an infinite number of users.
More interesting was the study of BEB utilized in the Ethernet protocol.
For more than the thirty-year-old history of Ethernet it was studied a
lot [16, 31, 36, 37, 39, 43, 44, 89, 100], and different models were suggested,
starting from infinite models, where the number of stations in the network
is infinite [16, 53, 54, 89], ending with a more specific case where only two
stations are involved [38].
One of the early studies was suggested by Kelly [53] (later Kelly et
al. [54]), a specific infinite model with Poisson incoming rate was used.
There was an infinite number of stations in the network, every station sends
at most one message, Nt is a random process which indicates the number of
backlogged messages. In the first work [53] it was shown that for schemes
that grow slower than exponential backoff Nt → ∞, while for exponential
backoff there exists a value vc, if the input rate is greater than this value,
then Nt → ∞, a lower input rate, however, does not guaranty stability in
terms of size of the backlog i.e., E(Nt). The second work [54] showed the
existence of such value a vc for the general class of random access schemes.
On the other hand Aldous [16] used a different infinite station model with
backoff scheme working as Poisson processes with different parameters. In
his work, Aldous showed that the backoff protocol (and not even backoff
protocol, but acknowledgement-based protocols in general) is unstable for
any packet arrival rate λ > 0. Additionally, Rosenkrantz as in the pa-
per earlier for ALOHA protocol proves that under an infinite user model
the protocol is unstable [89]. The analysis shows that the corresponding
Markov chain is transient using martingales.
However, later Hastad et al. [43] showed using a finite model and Bernoulli
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input process that the polynomial backoff protocol is stable for any λ in
terms of positive recurrence (it contradicts the results of Kelly et al. [53]).
They measured stability in terms of the average waiting time Wave and
the average number of waiting messages Lave and said that the stability of
any of these values leads to stability of another. In contrast they showed
that BEB (or any exponential backoff) is unstable if the overall input rate
λ ≥ .567 + 14N−2 , where N is the number of stations (it contradicts Aldous’
result [16]), and also any linear or sublinear backoff protocol is unstable.
Later, the extended version [44] had more details on the analysis. The ac-
tual analysis was fully based on the method of potential function (in some
sources referred to as Lyapunov [39]), see Theorem 2. The main achieve-
ment of Hastad et al. was that they used a model which is closest to a real
system, instead of early works with an infinite number of station, and in
that model they gained stability conditions in some cases.
Additionally, Goodman et al. [38,39] performed an analysis of a model
with a finite number of stations, which is also closer to reality. They ana-
lyzed the N station model, however, a more exact result has been reached
for a two-station model. The simplified version of it says that the BEB
algorithm is stable for λ1 = λ2 ≤ 0.15. The work of Shenker [92], however,
argues with the results of Hastad about the stability of polynomial backoff.
It states that polynomial backoff is stable for the whole channel capacity
λ < 1, but exponential and linear are not.
Finally, it is worth to mention a set of papers on traffic analysis of the
Ethernet protocol [24, 65, 94]. While the first one [94] gives some early
practical results for the protocol work, which are widely used in theoretical
analysis, another paper [24] after some period performs analysis of the traf-
fic with additional knowledge of theoretical assumptions, and also gives an
answer to which assumptions were adequate and which were not applica-
ble. It also shows that a great impact on the performance has the capture
effect, an effect when one station is able to send with higher probability
than others (so it unfairly captures the channel). The theoretical work of
Hastad et al. [44] utilizes it during the proof of the theorem on potential
function. The self-similarity of Ethernet traffic was also studied in [65].
The second inspiration in the study of backoff protocols came up with
the adoption of the scheme in the IEEE 802.11 protocol [22] and work
on the performance of Bianchi [23]. The work was mainly focused on the
performance of the protocol instead of the long-term dependencies (such
as stability and ergodicity). It used a set of assumptions which later were
considered to be reasonable and that simplified the study. Two of them
were standard assumptions in theoretical works: stations are identical and
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time divided into timeslots, and two were new. The first one is that the
stations are saturated with messages. It means that a station always has
messages in the queue to send. It is a natural assumption, as if the station
has no messages in the sending queue then it is most probably performing
better than the station with messages in the queue. In many cases the
saturated model shows worse performance than the unsaturated; however,
a study without such assumption creates a lot of cases that should be con-
sidered separately. Lastly, there was an assumption on the steady state of
the network work, i.e. the collision probability at any moment of time is
identical and equal to pc (it tends to be true with increase of the number
of stations). This is the most strong restriction of the analysis. Recently
a study of such assumption was conducted in [58], where the restriction
was named fixed-point equation (FPE). The work of Bianchi suggested a
corresponding Markov chain model and studied the standard BEB protocol
implemented in IEEE 802.11. An advanced analysis on the same model,
with a wide range of exponential backoff schemes was conducted in the
work of Kwak et al. [60]. The most optimal value for the factor, which is
used in an exponential protocol (in standard BEB protocol factor equals 2)
was found and also a model for study of bounded backoff protocol was sug-
gested, when the number of failed retrials before discarding were bounded
from above, while a classical analysis (for finite and infinite station models)
assumes it to be equal infinity. Based on these analyses an extended schema
which differs greatly from the backoff protocol was suggested [95,96]. They
have the form of adaptive backoff protocols, which take into account the
load of the network at any moment in time. A recent survey and more
bibliographical notes can be found in the following work [26].
The development of game theory in the computer science field also
affected the study of backoff protocols. The protocols were reconsidered
from the game-theoretical point of view, and the analysis indicated that
the equilibrium behavior is selfish in nature, i.e., non-standard protocols
will be taken [57]. The later work suggested an algorithm for fairness called
CRISP (Cooperation via Randomized Inclination to Selfish/Greedy Play),
which is logically based on Prisoner’s Dilemma. Another algorithm to deal
with unnecessary selfish behavior was suggested by Altman et al. [17]; it
utilizes the jamming mechanism, to ensure that the misbehaving station
will receive necessary punishment.
2.5 Future Internet: overlays, confidentiality, techniques 33
2.5 Future Internet: overlays, confidentiality, tech-
niques
In this section we are going to talk about new trends and technologies that
are being innovated for the Internet today. They were studied and proposed
a while ago, and mainly are hot study subjects today, however, they are not
massively accepted by the industry and pop up as commercial projects one
by one (e.g. [9]). Some standards for such technologies are in the process
of formation nowadays ( [3, 8]).
We will discuss briefly all the technologies, as in some sense they are
all related to our research. First we will list and briefly introduce P2P
technologies, and structures on them. After that we give an overview of
HIP, finalizing it with the publish subscribe technique.
2.5.1 Peer-to-Peer and Distributed Hash Tables
A decade ago a growing interest in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communications
shook the Internet community. It was the communications not based on
the well known server-client basis, but on an equal-to-equal basis (or peer-
to-peer), where any participant of the communications could play the role
of a server or a client for others. Thus, peers distributed the content among
themselves, without a central server or with it, but only for some interaction
control, instead of being data servers for others. The first P2P systems were
later named unstructured, and the most known of them are Gnutella [25]
and KazaA [63] (others may be found in any survey). There were some
legacy issues on the first P2P systems, but for the community it was shown
that the chaotic P2P system may possess strong survival properties.
Later, the structured versions of P2P systems were suggested by the
academia. The most known were CAN [87], Tapestry [109], Chord [98]
and Pastry [91]. There is a lot more, and also new structured, as well as
unstructured P2P systems appear every day. The structured P2P systems
were named distributed hash tables (DHT) as their main role is to be a
large hash table. Data are presented there as key-value pairs which are
distributed among the network: every participant in the network is respon-
sible for a set of keys and keeping the data for these keys. The protocol
itself states which node is responsible for which key and how different nodes
should interact in order to keep the network consistent. A full overlay sur-
vey can be found in [68] with additional comparison on time consumption
for search, insert, delete operations for different DHTs and unstructured
P2P systems.
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Figure 2.5: Host identity protocol as a new layer in OSI model (image is
taken from InfraHIP Project [5]).
2.5.2 Host Identity Protocol
Host Identity Protocol [41] is a new layer in the Open System Interconnec-
tion Reference model (OSI model), the main purpose of which is to separate
the network layer from the transport layer of the OSI model. Because the
network layer plays the dual location/identity role and the transport layer
is fully based on the network layer, the mobility properties of the nodes
were restricted in the Internet. When an application starts some network
connections it mainly uses the transport layer or even higher layers (sockets
for example) and, thus, unaware of the network layer, from the application
position it mainly uses the identity of the data in the Internet, instead of
the actual position. The P2P networks above also showed that the com-
munications are mainly based on the identity (for hosts, or a piece of data)
rather than on actual locations. The location problem is handled by under-
lay mechanisms. Thus the question of location/identity separation arose for
the current TCP/IP stack. The HIP introduces a new layer in the network
stack as shown in Figure 2.5.
Additionally, HIP introduces security on this layer, based on Inter-
net Protocol Security (IPsec) and (Encapsulating Security Payload) ESP
encapsulation of the traffic. All nodes communicate between each other
through Host Identity Tags (HITs). To communicate, the nodes use HIT
(in fact it is a hashed public key) as the identities of stations that they want
to connect to, and the HIP, based on the identities, states location where
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to send the traffic on the network layer. The HIP uses a four-way hand-
shake mechanism to initialize any connection (to agree on the HITs used
and the algorithm), and a two-way handshake for update packets in order
to switch location (mobility) or interface (multihoming), i.e., change the
IP address from one to another. The initial four-way handshake is called
base exchange (BEX) in HIP. For the start of the BEX, the HIP receives
HIT for the remote node which it is asked to connect to. However, the
communication goes on the standard network layer (IPsec), which requires
the IP address of the remote machine, not the HIT. To get the (HIT, IP )
pair, the HIP defines a few mechanisms which may replace each other. It is
(a) use of DNS, (b) use of local information (hosts file), (c) use of overlay,
some DHT (as the HIT is already an identity in a form of a hash), (d)
use rendezvous servers, and some more. After the connections are estab-
lished, the traffic goes to the IP which is in a local database corresponds to
the given HIT. The IP in the database may be changed on-the-fly (update
messages will inform the remote machine), and thus support mobility.
One of the available implementations of HIP for Linux platforms, is
called HIPL [5] (InfraHIP project). There are other available HIP imple-
mentations; all of them are realizations of the HIP specification of the IETF
working group [3].
2.5.3 Publish/Subscribe technique
The Publish/Subscribe technique [29] responds to the recent trends in In-
ternet development. The main purpose of this paradigm is to change the
way Internet parties communicate. Instead of the classical point-to-point
interactions it suggests publish/subscribe interaction, which in many cases
adopts P2P communications principle. When a set of nodes contributes
to the other set of nodes, one set of nodes defines the service they provide
(or data they contribute) and the other set of nodes defines what services
(or pieces of data) they want and subscribe to them. Such a scheme may
deal with SPAM (unwanted traffic) by simple logic: if one does not want
something from the others, it won’t subscribe for that. This thinking also
includes the idea that the subscriber hides its location address from others
parties, and reveals only some specific address for those publishers from
whom it wants to receive the service. Others, possibly even knowing that
specific address, should not be able to use it (send data there) or the sub-
scriber can easily change it if needed.
One of the implementations of the publish/subscribe technique is Inter-
net Indirection Infrastructure [97]. It is an application, which is based on
the Chord DHT algorithm. It implements a DHT service network which
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gives the ability to external stations to publish special information – trig-
gers in the DHT. A trigger has the form (id,R), where the id is the identity
number of the trigger (used in DHT); it is used as the address where data
may be sent, and R is another address where each packet that comes to
the trigger on address id should be redirected. Hence, any node may insert
a trigger with some id, and set R equal to its own IP address, in that case
the data that comes to the trigger id will be redirected to the node IP.
Thus, individual stations for communication do not have to reveal their
IP addresses. The (id,R) pair may also point to another trigger in the
i3 network, i.e., if id1, id2 - triggers id, then it is possible to insert chain
triggers as (id1, id2), (id2, R). i3 also supports unicast, mobility and any-
cast, it only restricts that there should not be any cycles. Such indirect
infrastructure forms a publish/subscribe scheme, we will show how we use
it in the following chapter.
2.6 Simulators and network tools
As a part of any new protocol study, simulation produces the necessary
connection between theory and practice. It is crucial to test any theoret-
ical ideas on a system that is closer to reality, before starting the actual
development process and implementation phase of any algorithm. Some
assumptions from theory could miss the confirmation in practice, and the
theory may be too far from reality. One should remember that the sim-
ulation tools also introduce some assumptions, that, however, are not as
important as the theoretical, and different tools are good for different in-
dividual tasks. In this section we are going to list most known network
simulators. Additionally, in our research we used all of them.
2.6.1 NS-2
Network simulator – 2 (NS-2) [10] is one of the most known and accepted
simulators nowadays. Recently, with development of the new NS-3 simu-
lator, it started to give up its positions. However, the NS-3 is not a direct
continuation of NS-2, thus, it is not such a straightforward modification as
the names suggest. During the period of development of NS-3 and inclu-
sion of new models to it, NS-2 may be used for the models that are not
supported by NS-3 yet. We utilized it for backoff protocol analysis for dif-
ferent backoff factors (see the next chapter) using built-in Ethernet model.
However, later we switched to NS-3 simulator and the IEEE 802.11 model
as it is more important for us than Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) model. This
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simulator also has a NAM graphical viewer, where anyone may observe the
process of the networking.
2.6.2 OMNet++/INET
Another very well known simulator tool is OMNeT++ [6], it is a C++
based simulator. In some sense it is a rival simulator to NS-2, however,
[101] compares them in the following manner: “. . . the NS-2 project goal
is to build a network simulator, while OMNeT++ intends to provide a
simulation platform, on which various research groups can build their own
simulation frameworks”. OMNeT++ supports different models, including
compilation of real-life systems, such as BSD TCP/IP stack, and a lot of
models specially created for OMNeT++. One of the most known and ac-
cepted is [4], which introduces a wide set of Internet protocols to make the
simulation more complete. We used the protocol for our study on defense
from DoS and congestion algorithms on the server side analysis; it is sup-
ported by BRITE (see next sections) and a close-to-real Internet structure
may be easily simulated using the combination BRITE/OMNeT++.
2.6.3 NS-3
Network simulator – 3 (NS-3) [11] is a logically newer simulator than NS-
2. That means that it is aimed at development of new models, which are
demanded by the computer science field. The paper [61] contains thoughts
on why it should be a new simulator instead of an upgraded version of NS-
2. Additionally, this simulator grew up from a small simulator for wireless
networks, and, thus, it has a big advantage on precision of the results in
wireless IEEE 802.11 study. Finally, NS-3 is well written, with excellent
programming patterns and programming templates, that meet high-level
code requirements, with garbage collectors, callback mechanisms, singleton
patterns, object factory patterns and others. Thus, programming in it may
produce high quality code, with high testability. Unfortunately (or not), it
does not support any graphical viewer or editor and thus, all results can be
analyzed only by the produced traces. As OMNeT++, it supports real-life
system, and even more, the authors say that a real system may be compiled
and integrated into it easily. A paper on performance comparison of the
NS-2, NS-3 and OMNeT++ [104] affirms that the NS-3 is one of the fastest
with least memory consumption.
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2.6.4 Network generation
As we said earlier, for our analysis of DoS defense mechanisms and conges-
tion resolution algorithms we used OMNeT++ simulator with connection
to BRITE network generator [2]. This network generator suggests a set of
models for generation of networks that are close to the Internet structure.
BRITE also supports a set of additional tools, such as the Otter visualiza-
tion tool. It may export the generated topology to NS-2, OMNeT++ and
others, but, unfortunately, it does not support NS-3. We used a slightly
modified generation method for OMNeT++, in order to produce a model
that contains some additional information, which lets the simulation pro-
cess work faster. More details on BRITE may be found in [78].
2.6.5 OverSim
Lastly, we want to mention the OverSim [7] simulation tool. It is a frame-
work that supports a set of P2P and DHT protocols. Compared to others,
which are mostly special tools for some fixed DHTs (such as Chord, Kadem-
lia, and so on), OverSim supports development of new general protocols,
and modification or improvement of the older ones. It is quite fast and
simple. One may find a comparison of a set of known tools in [21].
2.7 Summary
This chapter is dedicated to a review of existing literature and background
on the studied topic. First of all, in the first section, we gave resource-
sharing problem definitions with historical remarks. There we showed what
congestion control and multiple-access schemes are, then we showed what
a denial-of-server attack and selfishness of users are; finally we explained
the problems of confidentiality. The following two sections covered neces-
sary mathematical background for Markov chain theory and Game Theory.
These sections contain basic definitions, theorems and examples of appli-
cation to communication networks. After that, we summarized the backoff
protocol study in a separate chapter. The study itself has a 30-year-history
and, thus, it is very complex with many sometimes contradictory results.
The next section covered topics of the future Internet view. These include
P2P technologies, where users communicate to each other as equal ones
instead of the classical client-server paradigm; after that we presented HIP
architecture, which introduces security solutions and defense mechanisms
of the DoS problem. It also produces the location/identity split for the
classical Internet architecture. We conclude the section with the pub/sub
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technique that allows to implement a novel scheme, when a user gets only
what the user subscribed to previously. Finally, in the last section we pre-
sented simulation tools and network tools that allow us to fully evaluate
different aspects of new algorithms and protocols.
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Chapter 3
Summary of results
In this chapter we are going to give a summary of the main results, which
were published and peer-reviewed on conferences and in journals. The au-
thor’s copy of them will be attached to the end of this thesis. The sections
in this chapter cover different aspects of a general backoff protocol, i.e.,
queueing-theoretical and game-theoretical analysis of the protocol, fairness
and simulation of the performance. Additionally, we study the defensing
mechanism against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and congestion resolu-
tion algorithms on TCP level. Next, we will try to cover some topics on
the fairness in peer-to-peer (P2P) interactions (overlays) and discuss the
reputation metrics which may be adopted. We use these both for DoS and
P2P study. In the end we are going to discuss confidentiality issues for
today’s Internet architecture and suggest techniques to improve it.
The work itself is dedicated to the concurrent resource sharing prob-
lems in multi-user environments. For all the problems we are applying our
reputation methodology in order to design a system where users performing
selfishly still form optimal system behavior. As well for each problem sepa-
rately we present analyses that cover all sides of the specific problems. We
cover three types of situations: exclusive concurrent access to a common
resource (backoff protocol), non-exclusive concurrent access to a common
resource (TCP congestion control and DoS), concurrent access to multiple
resources (overlay). Throughout this chapter, we show how a general rep-
utation system may be adopted to these problems. However, more specific
technologies (such as, MKFS algorithm) cannot be applied to another forms
of resource sharing problems (i.e., MKFS is not applicable to the backoff
scheme). With these methods and algorithms we produce an analysis of
the mentioned access type problems and in a sense, they produce a cover
of different resource-sharing problems under various assumptions.
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3.1 Backoff protocol analysis
In the paper on the general backoff algorithm [70], we performed an analysis
of the backoff protocol from a queueing theory viewpoint, in terms of aver-
age service time in slots, and time units. We suggested an extension [73] for
the basic protocol in order to make it more fair for end stations (especially,
in case of the IEEE 802.11 protocol). Additionally, we studied the cases of
equilibrium with selfish user behavior [69], and point out how a technique of
an arbiter can improve the overall performance in case of selfishness of end
stations. Additional studies on reputation metric suggest metric functions
possible to use in order to control the behavior of the stations.
The following sections describe it all in the publication order. First of
all we are going to talk about the basic protocol and its measurements.
After that some advanced version of the protocol will be given. Lastly, the
game-theoretical study of the protocol will be explained.
3.1.1 Basic protocol
As was said in the previous chapter, the backoff protocol has more than
a 30-year-old study history. The results of these analyses deviate a lot,
and in many cases even contradict each other. Everything is dependent on
the adopted model and assumptions produced in the analysis. Based on
these studies, the model of Bianchi [23] seems to be most relevant as the
practice and the results are also supported by corresponding simulations.
The same model, though written in slightly different form, was used in
Kwak et al. [60]. The first work studied BEB for IEEE 802.11 and the
average time consumed for the protocol work. The second one studied
a set of exponential backoffs, where exponent (or backoff factor) r is not
restricted by 2. It also suggests a model for a bounded backoff model,
where the number of failed attempts to send a message is bounded. In our
work [70], we include these models, however, we study a general backoff
protocol.
The backoff protocol was discussed in the previous chapter. We will
formulate it in terms of general backoff function and will give the relevant
model. First of all, we have four main assumptions, based on which we
may analyze the work of only one station to get the network behavior:
(i) All stations are identical.
(ii) Everything is synchronized by timeslots (the IEEE 802.11 has the
property of synchronization by ends of messages, as during transmis-
sion of messages, all remaining stations hold their states.).
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Figure 3.1: Unbounded state model for backoff counter forms transitions
between states for corresponding Markov chains.
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Figure 3.2: Bounded state model for backoff counter forms transitions be-
tween states for corresponding Markov chains.
(iii) Model is in steady state, i.e., every station at any moment of time sees
messages in the network with probability pc (pc ∈ (0, 1)).
(iv) Model is in saturated state, i.e., at any moment of time our station
has messages in the queue.
Let us consider one station out of N stations in the network. It has a backoff
counter b - the number of successive collisions. The station tries to send
messages in its input queue. The procedure is as follows: the station takes
a message from the top of the queue, and gets value b for the message, if
the message is taken the first time then b should be equal to 0. The station
has a set of integer-valued (if it is a set of real numbers, it will not affect
the analysis a lot) functions g(i), i ≥ 0. The station tries to send a message
to one of the following g(b) timeslots randomly with uniform distribution.
In [70] we used function W0f
−1(i) instead of g(i). We know that any such
attempt fails with probability pc. If the message is sent correctly, then the
station sets b = 0 and takes the following message in the queue, otherwise
it increases the backoff counter by one b← b+1 and repeats the procedure.
If the value of b becomes larger than some prefixed M , then the message is
discarded, the backoff counter is also nullified and the station takes a new
message from the queue. We say that the backoff protocol is bounded if
M <∞, and unbounded otherwise.
State models for bounded M < ∞ and unbounded M = ∞ cases are
shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1, respectively.
We name the backoff function G(pc) ≡
∑M
i=0 g(i)p
i
c, this function will
hold all the properties of the backoff protocol used, depending on the values
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Figure 3.3: Level function and its intersection with different backoff pro-
tocols. G(x) = FE(x) for exponential backoff, G(x) = FQ(x) for quadratic
(polynomial) backoff, G(x) = FL(x) for linear backoff.
g(i), i ≥ 0. If we define the “level” function as
L(pc) ≡
(
1− pM+1c
) (
1 + (1− pc)
1
N−1
)
W0 (1− pc)
(
1− (1− pc)
1
N−1
) ,
then equation G(pc) = L(pc) gives us point pc as solution. The behavior of
the level function is shown in Figure 3.3.
We also prove that a sufficient condition for the equation G(pc) = L(pc)
to have only one solution in case M = ∞ is monotonous increase of func-
tions g(i) with respect to i. Later, the same condition was also proved
in [58] as Theorem 5.1.
If we define S as the service time for a message, then the average service
time for such a model in timeslots has the following form
ES =
(
1− pM+1c
)
(1− pc)
(
1− (1− pc)
1
N−1
) ,
and the necessary condition to have stability in terms of the size of the
message queue is
λ <
N (1− pc)
(
1− (1− pc)
1
N−1
)
(
1− pM+1c
) .
where λ is the average input rate, it may be a Bernoulli process or any
other. The saturation condition is also not so important for stability as the
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Figure 3.4: Unbounded state model for backoff counter forms transitions
between states for corresponding Markov chains with artificial state for the
input process, that helps to use negative drift technique.
technique of negative drift may be used. With a slightly modified model
(see Figure 3.4) we say that we let a station have C messages (where C is
large). After that if the expected number of steps to return to the station
with such a number of messages is finite, then it may be shown that the
chain is stable and it holds if the bound on λ above holds.
In the special case of unbounded protocol (when M = ∞) we may
minimize the average service time, the minimum point
p∗c = 1−
(
1− 1
N
)N−1
,
which tends to 1 − e−1 as the number of stations goes to infinity. In such
a case the supreme of the stable input rate is
λ∗ = sup
{
λ : λ <
(
1− 1
N
)N−1}
,
which tends, with an increase of number of stations, to the well known limit
e−1.
The equation G(p∗c) = L(p∗c) gives us all protocols that achieve this min-
imum point, i.e., any optimal protocol should have the following condition
fulfilled
G(p∗c) =
2N − 1(
1− 1N
)N−1 .
When the number of stations goes to infinity, the optimal point tends to
1− e−1 and optimal backoff tends to exponential backoff with factor e, i.e.
g(i) = ei.
The case when a backoff protocol is bounded (when M < ∞) can be
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Figure 3.5: The graphs show how level functions (L(x)) for different number
of stationsN intersect bounded exponential protocols F 16a (x), with factors a
equal to 2.1 and 2.4, and intersect truncated BEB protocol from Ethernet
F 16E (x). The X axis is the probability of collisions and Y axis almost
proportional to average service time (for us most important on the graph
are the intersection points).
viewed in Figure 3.5, where
F 16E (pc) =
10∑
i=0
2ipic +
16∑
i=11
210pic
=
1− (2pc)11
1− 2pc + 2
10p11c
1− p6c
1− pc .
is the protocol similar to the one used in IEEE 802.11 (although with
W0 = 1) and
FMa (x) =
M∑
i=0
aixi =
1− (ax)M+1
1− ax ,
is just an exponential backoff protocol, with exponent a.
The numerical analysis for it is given in Table 3.1.
As said, the optimality task for average service time ES was given in
terms of timeslots. It is a natural model as, though the timeslots have
different time lengths, the protocol in practice can also be virtually divided
in operational slots which do not intersect and cover the whole time line.
However, it is also important to see the optimization problem, not in num-
ber of timeslots, but in real time. For real-time measurements, we need
to define three kinds of slots: (a) idle slot, when no transmission happens,
the average time for such a slot is Ti, (b) collision slot, when two or more
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Number of stations Backoff function pc
ES
N Pdiscard
11 F 162.4(x) 0.48 2.77 3 ∗ 10−6
11 F 162.1(x) 0.54 2.64 3 ∗ 10−5
11 F 16E (x) 0.62 2.59 3 ∗ 10−4
51 F 162.4(x) 0.54 2.76 3 ∗ 10−5
51 F 162.1(x) 0.62 2.69 3 ∗ 10−4
51 F 16E (x) 0.74 2.83 6 ∗ 10−3
101 F 162.4(x) 0.57 2.74 6 ∗ 10−5
101 F 162.1(x) 0.65 2.71 7 ∗ 10−4
101 F 16E (x) 0.80 3.02 0.022
501 F 162.4(x) 0.64 2.72 5 ∗ 10−4
501 F 162.1(x) 0.73 2.82 5 ∗ 10−3
501 F 16E (x) 0.94 3.86 0.349
1001 F 162.4(x) 0.67 2.73 1.2 ∗ 10−3
1001 F 162.1(x) 0.77 2.93 0.012
1001 F 16E (x) 0.99 3.52 0.809
Table 3.1: Numeric results for bounded exponential protocols F 16a (x), with
factors a equal to 2.1 and 2.4, and for truncated BEB protocol from Eth-
ernet F 16E (x), where pc stands for collision probability, N for the number
of stations, ES for the average service time for packets on a station and
Pdiscard for the probability to discard a message (failed to send).
stations collide during one slot, the average time for such an event is Tc,
and (c) successful slot, when some station successfully transmits a message
during the timeslot, the average time of it is Ts. Finally, the expected av-
erage time in time units for such a system can be found by the following
equation
ETS =N(Ts − Tc) + 1
1− pcTc+
(1− pc)(N − 1)
(
(1− pc)1−
1
N−1 − 1
)(
(1− pc)Ti + pcTc
)
.
It is worth to mention that the value of Ts does not affect the optimization
problem and if Tc = Ti, then optimization in time units is equivalent to the
one in timeslots.
If we consider a particular case of the equation above, when the BEB
protocol is considered instead of a general backoff protocol, then we will
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Figure 3.6: Average throughput for a saturation during 1 min
get the same result as in Bianchi [23].
3.1.2 Extensions
Our previous work studied the backoff protocol under the assumption of
identity of the stations and the steadiness of the network (i.e., existence of
pc). The latter is called fixed-point analysis, and is studied in more detail in
Kumar et al. [58]. However, these assumptions are not always true, and in
this section we are going to talk about the case when they break. First of all,
the steadiness of the network clearly hides the presence of the capture effect
from us. In [24] it was shown how the capture effect affects the protocol
work. Thus, the analysis above is more applicable for networks with a large
number of stations, while it has a set of unnecessary assumptions for small
networks. Additionally, the condition on the identity of the stations breaks
for wireless protocols, where stations may be scattered around the AP.
The ones closer to the AP have higher probability to successfully transmit
than others, because the signal strength is stronger, and it is being reduced
greatly with distance. Hence, even collisions could not be sensed by the
closest station, while more distant ones are not able to get consistent signals
to the AP.
Based on that, we present and study [73] a modified class of backoff
protocols in order to reduce the capture effect. To define the class, we will
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Figure 3.7: Standard deviation for stations during 1 min
consider a model from the previous section. Let us have for any station
M states, for every state we wait randomly with uniform distribution on
interval g(i), where i is the number of states. The probability of collision
in the network is still pc. However, the states are connected in a different
manner. If a station collides when it is in state j, then
(a) if j = M then the message is discarded, and the message goes to a
specified state (not necessarily 0).
(b) if j < M then the state changes to state j + 1.
It has little difference to the protocol above, however, in case of success
the state returns not to initial state 0, but according to a matrix
Pˆ =

p0 p1 . . . pi . . . PM
1 0 0 0 . . . 0
p2,0 p2,1 0 0 . . . 0
p3,0 p3,1 p3,2 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
pM,0 pM,1 pM,2 pM,3 . . . 0
 ,
where the sum of every row is equal to 1. As we can see the matrix is defined
based on the states above, and returns back (in some cases forward) with
some probability. We name the whole class of such protocols Reverse Matrix
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Figure 3.8: Average throughput for RMAB during 1 min
Adaptive Backoff (RMAB) algorithms. If p0 = 1 and, hence, the remaining
pi = 0 then it is a special case and we name it, simply, Matrix Adaptive
Backoff (MAB) as there is no “reverse” jumps in the corresponding matrix:
Pˆ =

1 0 0 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 0 . . . 0
p2,0 p2,1 0 0 . . . 0
p3,0 p3,1 p3,2 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
pM,0 pM,1 pM,2 pM,3 . . . 0
 .
For such sets of protocol we want to find a stationary distribution for
the corresponding Markov chain. We need it in order to get the average
service time for this adaptive backoff protocol which may be found as in the
previous section based on the state distribution (in previous chapter states
were simply geometrically distributed). Much of the work is dedicated to
study of RMAB, in the end, however, we explicitly solve only one special
case - the MAB algorithm.
The resulting probability to send successfully (or discard unsuccessfully)
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in state i pi∗i for RMAB can be found by the following system:
pi∗0 = (1− pc)
∑M
k=0 pk,0pi
∗
k,
pi∗i = pcpi
∗
i−1 + (1− pc)
∑M
k=0 pk,ipi
∗
k, 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1,
pi∗M = pcpi
∗
M−1 + pcpi
∗
M + (1− pc)
∑M
k=0 pk,Mpi
∗
k.
In a special case of MAB it is

pi∗0 = (1− pc)
∑M
k=0 pk,0pi
∗
k,
pi∗i = pcpi
∗
i−1 + (1− pc)
∑M
k=i+1 pk,ipi
∗
k, 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1,
pi∗M = pcpi
∗
M−1 + pcpi
∗
M .
The importance of RMAB is proved in the simulation part of the work.
Using NS-3 for the wireless IEEE 802.11 standard we simulated a set of
stations (N = 5, 10, 20, 40) under the RTS/CTS scheme, in order to neglect
the influence of frame size on the results. The simulation runs for 60 seconds
over 11 Mbps channels and every station always has messages to send.
Thus all stations are active, without the hidden station problem. As was
discussed in the previous chapter, the RTS/CTS scheme helps to deal with
the problem. We simulated the MAB protocol, where g(i) = 15∗ (1.1)i and
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the MAB matrix is
Pˆ =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0

.
The difference as one can see in Figure 3.6 and in Figure 3.7 is not so
big to the standard BEB protocol. However a RMAB protocol of the form
Pˆ =

0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0

showed a great increase in fairness in the transmission, the overall trans-
mission of bytes does not deviate a lot, as one can see in Figure 3.8. A
simple MAB scheme does not show the increase, e.g., in Figure 3.9.
3.1.3 Selfishness
The previous paragraphs touched on the topic of backoff protocol in terms
of optimality of service time and fairness. They suggested a mathematical
basis for analysis of this optimality based on a variation of backoff function
forms g(i) for all i and the change of the state model. Based on that,
stations can gain the most optimal behavior in the system of stations,
if they behave identically. An extension of the backoff protocol, which
was mentioned in the previous section, partly considers the problems when
stations do not behave identically. It was said that some stations may be
closer to the AP and that there exists a capture effect for such networks.
In this section we are going to talk about the case when stations in-
tentionally do not behave identically, but instead every station adjusts its
backoff function, or more generally the time to send any message at any
moment of time is based on individual choice. When the station gains
some strategy space to make a selfish choice, the problem becomes game-
theoretical, compared to the problem, that is based on a pre-fixed protocol.
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Figure 3.10: Three stations make a decision to occupy 2, 2 and 3 timeslots
from T given (occupation is a random process). Stations 1 and 3 occupy
one common timeslot — k and, hence, the messages that they send will
collide.
In the work [69], we consider a simplified model, where every station
decides on a strategy only at the start of a round. The round consists of T
timeslots. Every station decides only the number of timeslots it will take
during the round. Hence, the strategy for station i consists of a choice
of the number ni, where 0 ≤ ni ≤ T . After choosing the value ni the
timeslots which will be occupied will be selected uniformly (one of
(
T
ni
)
,
where
(
n
m
)
is a binomial coefficient and
(
n
m
)
= n!m!(n−m)!). An example of
such an allocation and choice is shown in Figure 3.10.
In mathematical literature the problem is known as the problem of
random allocations [56]. The solution of the problem suggests taking ev-
erything for every station — be fully selfish. However, the problem itself is
formulated in such a manner that everything is decided beforehand, thus
the idea of repeating Prisoners’ Dilemma is not applicable here. However,
it may be changed if the number of rounds (T timeslots each) is not equal
to 1 (i.e., repeating rounds).
The problem stated above gets optimal value with fair division of the
slots among participants only if everyone will take “its” own amount of the
channel TN . But it is not the individual choice of stations, thus, a technique
of arbiter may be applied here. I.e., a station (maybe AP) or a set of
stations checks that everyone sends its partition of data and not more than
fixed amount, otherwise the arbiter jams the channel making it unavailable
(in case of AP it simply does not accept excess traffic). This strategy,
however, does not guarantee the existence of only one Nash equilibrium
coincident to the system optimum as we wanted to design. Additionally,
not all stations may want to send some data at a given round. Thus, this
technique has restrictions on applicability.
We may apply our studies on reputation metrics in that case. Every
station receives some starting reputation at an initial moment of time,
say k0. After that every station decides how much it needs compared to
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suggested amount T/N , let it be a function u(t) : ∀t 0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 2. The
value u(t) = 0 says that a station does not ask anything from the channel at
moment t, while u(t) = 1 says that it demands its amount T/N . A greater
value says that a station asks more than its fair amount, and thus will “pay”
for it in the future. In mathematical analysis we restricted the variable by
2, but it is not so important in practice. We may neglect the influence of the
remaining stations, in that case the problem may be formulated in terms
of control theory; we studied it in [71]. The problem may be formulated in
the following form 
∫ T
0
ki(t)
X(t)
u(t)dt→ max
k˙i(t) = ki(t)(1− ki(t))(1− u(t))
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 2
ki(0) = k
0
i
0 < k0 < 1.
where ki(t) plays the role of history, i.e., the result of past behavior of a
player i and X(t) =
∑
i ki(t). The solution of the system in terms of control
theory (it may be considered, as a particular case of game theory) suggests
that if a station stays in the system long enough then it will tend to request
its own fair proportion of channel. Otherwise, if a station does not stay in
the system more than one round, for example, it will try to take as much as
possible (u(t) = 2). This model is true for a large amount of players. For
two players, a similar model is suggested in [72]. The optimal trajectories
are also found there, however they are not found explicitly.
Some additional papers on the jammers in wireless networks and fairness
may be found [17].
3.2 Defense against Denial-of-Service attacks and
congestion control algorithms
The Denial-of-Service (DoS or DDoS, for distributed) attack is one of the
major Internet problems. In this section we are going to summarize the de-
fense techniques that we suggested in works [71] and [74]. These techniques
do not distinguish malicious users from the benign ones (by assumption at-
tacking packets by themselves are not distinguishable), but they use some
properties that differentiate the first group of users from the second one.
Thus the techniques themselves are also suitable for congestion control on
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Figure 3.11: Scheme of basic DDoS attack: an attacker gives an order to
zombie nodes (infected) to attack/flood the victim server. The attacker
may interact with the zombie nodes indirectly.
the server side or a link, although they require some central control for
that.
Schematically DDoS attacks can be considered as shown in Figure 3.11.
An attacker initiating the attack sends commands to the zombie machines,
possibly through some intermediate machines, and the zombie stations start
the attack on the server. From the server’s point of view, a lot of new re-
quests from new clients start to circulate in the network. If the packets
are simple and distinguishable then the server can start to filter them out,
but by our assumption they are not. The biggest problem for the server
may cause spoofed IP addresses, when a zombie machine generates a new
identity for a new packet. Thus the server discovering a new IP address
cannot say whether the address belongs to a new benign client or forged by
a zombie. Based on that we suggest two algorithms, one for new clients —
it deals with new identities and ensures the work of the server by attack-
ing from the spoofed addresses (we name it Most Knocked First Served
(MKFS)) and another for addresses that were already checked and “en-
tered” the system. The second algorithm is based on reputation of the
users, while the first one is mainly based on a specific queueing policy. The
scheme of the algorithm interaction may be found in Figure 3.12.
3.2.1 Spoofed addresses
For dealing with the spoofed IP addresses, we suggest a novel MKFS al-
gorithm (MKFS for Most Knocked First Served) [74]. The algorithm uses
the property of forged IP address. Whenever a message that came from
a spoofed address will be sent back to the address it will never get to the
zombie, which sent it (Of course, it does not apply when middle boxes are
poisoned, the middleboxes may speak for a subset of clients, the middle-
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Figure 3.12: The relation of DDoS defense mechanisms against spoofed
addresses and misbehavior of indistinguishable users.
server
client 1
client 2
client N
MKFS client
MKFS client
MKFS server MKFS client
new
message
validated
 
 


 
 


 
 


 
 


  
  


 
 


Figure 3.13: Network view for MKFS algorithm work.
boxes, however, probably are more secured than the normal users’ systems).
So the server just says all clients “knock me with as many packets as you
can, I will reply to the ones who knocked most, i.e., who is on the top of
the corresponding priority queue”. The benign clients will stop knocking
whenever they receive a reply, and spoofed zombie stations will send some
number of request before changing the identity. However, the zombie sta-
tions lose if they send too few messages (thus they do not get to the top of
the queue), or send too many messages, thus, sending superfluous amount
of messages. On top of everything, to get one reply from a server zombies
spend a number of requests (say K); in the classical FIFO scheme, they
would generate a new packet for every identity; in this scheme the power
of the attack is reduced by factor K.
The network principle of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3.13. It
may be implemented as some tree network of supporting routers if the
attack goes on server link capacity instead of the actual server CPU cycle
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Algorithm 1 MKFS algorithm.
Require: Q is a valid priority queue.
1: loop
2: if server terminates its work then
3: return
4: end if
5: if server is ready to process I and I has a message then
6: Get id next from I.
7: if id is a new and is not ans(id) then
8: pr(id)← 1
9: add id to Q with priority pr(id)
10: else
11: pr(id)← pr(id) + 1
12: update Q with priority pr(id) for id
13: end if
14: end if
15: if server is ready to process one message then
16: take id from top of Q
17: update Q
18: send reply to id
19: ans(id)← true
20: end if
21: end loop
consumption. The tree may separate traffic and just send forward a number
of requests from identities. Algorithms that enforce the use of the server-
side routers (filters, or middleboxes) are commonly suggested in literature,
we, however, try to make the usage of these devices as minor as possible.
The analysis of this queueing policy suggests that for an attacker the
optimal number of retries (number of packets with the same identity be-
fore forging a new one) grows until the attacks become insignificant (as the
growth of the retry number K reduces the strength of attack). We pro-
duced a simulation of the algorithm for two cases, when the attackers are
able to send traffic at the same speed as benign users and a case when a
zombie produces the traffic ten times slower than benign users. The graphs
are shown in Figures ??. For the analysis we used the BRITE generator
(with our own modifications) to produce the network for the OMNeT++
simulator.
In the figures one can see that independently of the time when the
attack started, the delay for benign users to enter the system is relatively
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Figure 3.14: The entrance time for new benign users when they may pro-
duce traffic at the same speed as zombie stations.
constant.
3.2.2 Indistinguishable users with true identities
The previous algorithm suggested the defense mechanism against users,
whose identities are forged and hence the server does not know, who ac-
tually sends the messages. In this section we will talk about the users,
who “entered” the system and, thus, their identities were approved. As
an attacker may implement a DDoS attack with the help of spoofing, the
large botnets may produce the same kind of attack without spoofing, sim-
ply creating a mob randomly “wandering” on the server, i.e., sending some
messages that have some sense for the server. If the server is not able to
produce a filter for such clients or actions based on separate packets, then
the server should observe all historical sequences of behavior. As we sug-
gested in [71], the server based on the identity produces some measure of
the last action of the client i at time t: ai(t) ∈ (−1, 1). The value ai(t) = −1
for the worst behavior, ai(t) = 1 for the best behavior and ai(t) = 0 for
neutral. We do not fix any method which may produce the measure, it
may be Bayesian networks or some heuristic, or what an engineer of an ac-
tual system suggests. The main rule is that it should somehow adequately
3.2 Defense against Denial-of-Service attacks and congestion control
algorithms 59
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200
D
el
ay
 (s
ec
)
Time (sec)
Figure 3.15: The entrance time for new benign users when they may pro-
duce traffic ten times faster than zombie stations.
represent the measure of the client’s action.
Based on that we suggest client reputation recomputation and the server
capacity separation mechanism. It was already introduced in the back-
off protocol section. If for user i, ki(t) — is the reputation at moment
t, then the server for every requested data may answer only proportion
ki(t)∑
i ki(t)
. Additionally, the metric evolves with change of ai(t) as following
k˙i(t) = ki(t)(1 − ki(t))ai(t). Hence, a bad sequence of behavior reduces
the reputation metric, while a good increases it; thus the metric’s grow in-
creases the proportion above. In the paper [71] we used the property that
the number of users is huge, i.e. N is a large number, where i ∈ [1, N ]
and thus for any station the behavior of remaining stations is not so rele-
vant. Own behavior becomes the most important, and thus, the formulated
multi-user game problem may be swapped with the control theory problem
like this one (replacing u(t) = 1 + ai(t) and assuming k0 to be the initial
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reputation): 
J =
∫ T
0
x(t)u(t)dt→ max
x˙(t) = x(t)(1− x(t))(1− u(t))
0 ≤ u(t) ≤ 2
x(0) = k0
0 < k0 < 1,
The analysis is based on the maximum principle of Pontryagin [84],
which searches the optimal solution in the open loop manner (controls
depending on the time and trajectory depending on time). The solution
of the suggested control problem states that moving along the optimal
trajectory the player may gain J = 2 ln
(
1 +
√
eT k01−k0 + 1
)
, which tends
to J/T → 1 while T → ∞, i.e. the player selects neutral behavior on the
average. The analytical results are partly supported by simulation in the
OMNeT++ framework (with BRITE for network generation). However,
additional simulation, where more sophisticated strategies are employed,
could be required and may strengthen the system.
Both techniques (MKFS and reputation based) may work separately as
well as in tandem.
3.3 Overlays: confidentiality and misbehavior
In this section we are going to talk about methods for how the overlays,
more precisely DHTs, help to defend against DDoS attacks if they are
enforced with HIP, and how they help get independence for the HIT-to-
IP resolution problem. The publish/subscribe technique helps to achieve
better algorithms for the secured traffic in the Internet. We touch on the
topic of misbehavior in overlays and mechanisms to control user behavior in
the structured or unstructured P2P networks. The mechanism was partly
already used in the backoff protocol and in the DDoS defense mechanism
in previous sections.
3.3.1 Separation of data/control plane
In the previous chapter, we mentioned HIP, which separates the network
and transport layers of the OSI model. We also showed that for actual com-
munications through HITs, the protocol needs to receive the corresponding
IP addresses from some outer source, be it DNS, overlay, which maps HITs
to IP addresses. The most critical for HIP is the BEX phase because both
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machines do not know the IP-addresses of each other (one of them does not
even know that another wants to connect to it). After the initial phase, if
one of the machines changes its IP address then it may itself give necessary
information to another machine about the new IP address (through update
messages). Thus, the mechanism is mainly used only during the initial-
ization of the connection (BEX), and rarely in case both stations changed
their IP addresses simultaneously.
In the paper on the hi3 [42], we suggested mechanisms to send and
receive the BEX messages without knowing the IP addresses of each other.
The i3 network itself is based on the triggers, thus any station may register
a trigger in the i3 network, which has the identity equal to the HIT of
the station, and the second destination part to own IP address, thus any
message that will be sent to the corresponding HIT will be delivered to the
IP address. Any station that knows only the HIT of another station in that
network, simply sends information on the trigger with the HIT identity and
it will be delivered. Thus, the station does not need to resolve HIT to IP
through some DNS server or whatever mechanism.
After the handshake is done through the i3 network, both stations know
the IP of each other, and thus they may start to use the underlaying network
for communications. They use i3 only for the control messages, it is not
optimal to send the data messages through the overlay, because it adds
latency to the data delivery process and the protocol becomes slower.
This technique additionally has some defense against the DDoS attacks.
As any station reveals its own IP address on the later stage of the BEX,
it may select the stations which it wants to give the information to, and
stations which it does not want to connect. The second message from the
initiator should solve a puzzle that the responder station sends in the first
message. Thus, a mechanism against the spoofing of the address is present
in the hi3 protocol. The triggers themselves may be switched if some trigger
is under a DDoS attack.
We produced a real-life realization of the hi3 protocol for the HIPL
version of HIP. It uses a part of the i3 protocol as a library, and open world-
wide i3 servers as i3 communication nodes, where triggers may be inserted.
The hi3 realization showed that the scheme is fully functioning, however,
the i3 library still has version 0.3 and some problems with communication
are present.
3.3.2 Reputation-based communications
We already said that the past decade showed the growth of different over-
lays, and mainly the growth was due to the file-sharing networks, when
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users distribute some data among themselves. One of the mostly used tools
for that is BitTorrent [1]. In most implementations a BitTorrent protocol
user may select the upload and download stream speed. The selection of
upload and download stream is necessary to restrict the software to use the
whole available bandwidth, and jam other user’s activity (such as classical
HTTPs).
In a sense the selection of the speeds is a strategy space for a user. In
that sense it presents as a player in a system. If there were no restrictions
and the player was fully aware about it, the player would use a strategy
to take all and not give anything back. Such selfish behavior is called free-
riding and some thoughts on it may found in [32]. On the other hand,
a user should be able to get something before others start to ask it for
contributions (where otherwise would the user get a piece of information
to contribute before consuming anything, if, of course, it is not own file?).
Thus, the system gives data to a user (especially a newcomer), which did
not contribute, however this leads to the possibility of whitewashing: a user
enters a system, gets all the system gives and leaves the system, changing
the identity and reenters with a new identity as a newcomer again. Hence,
a system (by a system we mean different sets of P2P users) should be
able to contribute to a newcomer, however, it should be restricted to make
the whitewashing as unprofitable as possible, keeping in mind control over
free-riding.
The discussion above leads to the idea of reputation, when we distin-
guish participants by the history of their actions. A good taxonomy on the
reputations in P2P systems is available in [76]. A game-theoretic approach
suggests the ways to deal with incentives for contribution, one of them is
in an auction among players [77].
However, for such a problem, we suggest and study a reputation metric
as before, and we previously showed that if the number of communicating
users is large then the problem may be formulated in terms of control
theory [71]. Indeed, with the growth of the number of users, one’s personal
influence on the whole stream is insignificant. However, the P2P protocols
are designed to uniformly distribute load (it is called load balancing), and
thus, the number of competing nodes which ask for some resource from the
same source are low, the mutual influence of the concurrent users is high.
Hence, it is more important to study the case when there are only two
nodes asking some data from the same source – another bound problem
formulation, opposite to the DDoS formulation. In that case it is clearly
a game-theoretical problem, which we address in [72]. In general we may
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formulate it as follows:∫ T
0
[
f(x1)r1(t)
f(x1)r1(t) + f(x2)r2(t) + 
− lc1(t)
]
dt→ max
∫ T
0
[
f(x2)r2(t)
f(x1)r1(t) + f(x2)r2(t) + 
− lc2(t)
]
dt→ max
x˙1(t) = c1(t)− r1(t)
x˙2(t) = c2(t)− r2(t)
0 ≤ c1(t), c2(t), r1(t), r2(t) ≤ 1
x1(0) = x2(0) = 0,

where functions ri(t) and ci(t) play the role of how much user i requests
and contributes at moment i. Requests are not the same as consumption,
it only shows how much one is asking. The amount of received data is
the proportion f(x1)r1(t)f(x1)r1(t)+f(x2)r2(t)+ , where xi(t) is the history of player’s
actions (in some sense reputation), or the full sum of all contributed data
and all requested data x˙1(t) = c1(t)− r1(t), and f(x(t)) is a function that
weighs it (or maps on [0,∞] space). The variable  is technical, needed only
for the adequacy of the solutions (we do not want to have zero divided by
zero problem in some cases). We formulate it for the same specific metric
as before (i.e., it is the same if we put x˙1(t) = c1(t) − r1(t)), but for a
two-player game in the following form:∫ T
0
[
k1r1(t)
k1r1(t) + k2r2(t) + 
− lc1(t)
]
dt→ max
∫ T
0
[
k2r2(t)
k1r1(t) + k2r2(t) + 
− lc2(t)
]
dt→ max
k˙1(t) = k1(1− k1)(c1(t)− r1(t))
k˙2(t) = k2(1− k2)(c2(t)− r2(t))
0 ≤ c1(t), c2(t), r1(t), r2(t) ≤ 1
k1(0) = k2(0) = 0.5.

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Now ki plays the role of history, reputation and the weight itself. In the
paper, we solve the game problem in terms of the rules of finding the
optimal trajectory (it is not solved in the explicit form of trajectory as in
the control theory case). For such a problem, the Hamiltonians have the
following form:
H1 =
(
lc1 − k1r1
k1r1 + k2r2 + 
)
+λ11k1(1− k1)(c1 − r1)+
λ12k2(1− k2)(c2 − r2)
H2 =
(
lc2 − k2r2
k1r1 + k2r2 + 
)
+λ21k1(1− k1)(c1 − r1)+
λ22k2(1− k2)(c2 − r2)
And the co-state variables are:
λ11(t) =
−1
k1(1− k1)
∫ T
t
(k2r2 + )k1r1(1− k1)
(k1r1 + k2r2 + )2
dt.
λ12(t) =
1
k2(1− k2)
∫ T
t
k1r1k2r2(1− k2)
(k1r1 + k2r2 + )2
dt.
λ22(t) =
−1
k2(1− k2)
∫ T
t
(k1r1 + )k2r2(1− k2)
(k1r1 + k2r2 + )2
dt.
λ21(t) =
1
k1(1− k1)
∫ T
t
k1r1k2r2(1− k1)
(k1r1 + k2r2 + )2
dt.
Now, only for convenience, we define new functions:
L11(t) = −λ11k1(1− k1) i.e. L11(t) =
∫ T
t
(k2r2+)k1r1(1−k1)
(k1r1+k2r2+)2
dt.
L12(t) = λ12k2(1− k2) i.e. L12(t) =
∫ T
t
k1r1k2r2(1−k2)
(k1r1+k2r2+)2
dt.
L21(t) = λ21k1(1− k1) i.e. L21(t) =
∫ T
t
k1r1k2r2(1−k1)
(k1r1+k2r2+)2
dt.
L22(t) = −λ22k2(1− k2) i.e. L22(t) =
∫ T
t
(k1r1+)k2r2(1−k2)
(k1r1+k2r2+)2
dt.
Based on these functions, which contain “information on the remaining
tail” of the optimal path, we define the optimal control as follows:
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ci =
{
0, if Lii(t) ≤ l,
1, if Lii(t) > l.
(3.1)
ri =

0, if Lii(t) > ai(t),
1, if Lii(t) ≤ bi(t),
di(t), otherwise .
where di(t) = − 1a +
√
1
aLii(t)
. The optimal control tells that the optimal
trajectory is to follow five possible tendencies, depending on the case, when
ci − ri is equal to −1, −di, 0, 1− di or 1. (See Figure 3.16).
-
biai 0
Lii(t)
ci − ri
l
1 0 −di −1
(a) l > ai(t).
-
biai 0
Lii(t)
ci − ri
l
1 1− di −di −1
(b) ai(t) ≥ l ≥ bi(t)
-
biai 0
Lii(t)
ci − ri
l
1 1− di 0 −1
(c) l < bi
Figure 3.16: Three possible cases for optimal controls for reputation-based
communications.
Thus, we get the solution on the optimal decision for a player, at any
moment of time (though not in explicit form). The solution states what to
optimally do at any given point. However, the reputation here is not global,
it may be computed by all individual nodes based on their interaction. For
example, if we have four nodes and nodes 1 and 2 connect to node 3,
then node number 4 does not know anything about the interconnection of
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nodes 1, 2 and 3. For such a problem the algorithm of EigenTrust [52]
is suggested. The algorithm spread the local information to global, thus
all local reputations may be summed up and form a global reputation for
a node. Otherwise, a player may produce the whitewashing, by changing
the node it requests for data every time (if local interaction data do not
propagate).
Chapter 4
Conclusion and future work
Conclusion
In this thesis we have studied a series of multi-user resource-sharing prob-
lems for the Internet. The analysis was made from different perspectives:
optimality of protocols, selfishness of end users, fairness of the protocol for
end users. This multifaceted analysis allows us to select the most suited
protocols among a set of various available based on trade-offs of optima
criteria, on one hand. On the other hand, the future Internet predictions
dictate new rules for optimality we should take into account and new prop-
erties of the networks that cannot be neglected anymore. In the thesis we
have studied new protocols for such resource-sharing problems as:
(a) Optimality of backoff protocol.
(b) DDoS defense mechanisms.
(c) Fairness and confidentiality in P2P networks.
For the backoff protocols based on the criteria of overall optimality for,
selfishness of and fairness among end-users we suggested different schemes
for the protocol, which in turn may be connected in a more general scheme.
Mainly, we constructed methodology on the analysis of optimality for such
schemes and partly produced the simulation work in order to reconcile the-
ory and practice. However, for further development of the optimal backoff
protocol (from different perspectives) the real implementation is the best
development of the presented achievements. Among the suggested analyses,
the study of fairness seem to be the most important for today’s Internet,
as the mobility of users grows and with it the amount of wireless stations
that have to interact in a common area grows. Thus, the problem that
the stations closest to the resources gain more access than distant ones is
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the heaviest. It leads to the problem of selfishness as users with modified
protocols may gain access to the resources with higher probability than
others, however, with the growth of the number of selfish users the access
to the resource may be jammed fully as we showed in our previous work.
For the DDoS defense mechanisms we suggested two algorithms: one
for dealing with the problem of forged addresses (MKFS) and one for in-
distinguishable users, based on reputations. The first one utilizes the idea
that stations with spoofed addresses do not receives feedback, and thus
have less knowledge about the server work than benign users. Reputations,
on the other hand, work for unspoofed zombie stations, which using a large
amount of packets attempting to stifle server performance. The reputation
mechanism based on the large amount of such packets compute characteris-
tics of how much every user may gain from the server (the server only needs
to be able to weigh such packets in an adequate manner on the average).
Both algorithms are analyzed and show gain in performance compared to
the classical FIFO scheme.
Lastly, we suggest techniques for confidentiality and fairness of the peers
in overlay networks. The confidentiality is based on the indirection scheme
of the i3 network, when all the traffic goes through overlay indirectly (using
triggers). The hi3 scheme strengthens the idea with additional security
for BEX, while the payload traffic (ESP) goes directly through underlay
(Internet) in order to make communication faster and overlay less loaded.
Additionally, for interactions in overlays we suggest the metrics that may
achieve fairness for end-user resource sharing. The metric may help to deal
with such overlay problems as free-riding and whitewashing. We formulate
the problem in game theoretical form and for specific reputation metrics
we found the optimal control solution in a decision-making form.
Future work
The research covered wide set of problems from many perspectives, which,
of course, still leaves a lot questions for further study. We are going to
address extensions that are possible to produce in the theory or/and a set
of implementations that can give the study results in practice.
For the backoff scheme, the work produces a set of optimality criteria
and shows how to achieve those separately (as trade-offs). Here, a more
sophisticated algorithm may be introduced, which is based on the current
network situation: it may decide to choose one optimal protocol over an-
other in order to adapt to the current network load and behavior, instead
of a prefixed one. Also, the NS-3 simulator is a good tool for the dif-
ferent backoff protocol analyses, however it does not support changes of
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backoff protocols, and thus, these modifications have to be hard-coded in-
side the simulator. A new flexible model for evaluation of general backoff
schemes is another direction of future work. Lastly, the new schemes them-
selves were studied mainly theoretically and were evaluated on simulators
(widely acknowledged, however), thus, it is an important step in future
work to produce real-life implementation of new backoff schemes in order
to strengthen the produced analysis.
For the DoS problems, the promising MKFS algorithm should be stud-
ied further and extended. A few possible extensions of the algorithms
include addition of a puzzle-scheme to the initial packets that the attacker
and benign clients sent to the server. The server, on the other hand, checks
the puzzle of an incoming message with some probability (in order to reduce
the load). When the puzzle is incorrect the server stops serving the packets
of the corresponding sender. This scheme allows us to add some computa-
tional difficulty to the sender and more severe punishment for misbehaving.
As another extension of future work, both DoS defense mechanisms may
be implemented in HIP, thus making it transparent for the application and
transport layer of the OSI model. This is very important, because it allows
us to use all currently existing transport protocols and applications without
any changes. Finally, these schemes may be implemented as part of HIP
or intermediate routers in order to reduce the load of the server.
For the P2P and overlays, a useful reputation scheme was introduced.
As future work it may be implemented in (on top of) today’s P2P networks
such as BitTorrent in order to produce behavioral control. Additionally, this
scheme is good to implement under the DHT algorithm (while currently
all reputation schemes are produced above), in the sense that DHT itself is
fully based on reputations of communicating nodes, i.e., send less control
packets to misbehaving nodes and so on. As the next intermediate step in
the protocol, implementation of reputation scheme for a P2P network in
the OverSim simulator is required. It will allow us to see more details and
behavior of such a scheme in reality – which is still missing in the work.
The hi3 scheme is also a good realization and proof of concept, however for
the HIP it should be extended and evaluated additionally.
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